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ABSTRACT 
 
 
OPERATIONAL RISK CAPITAL PROVISIONS FOR BANKS AND INSURANCE 
COMPANIES 
 
 
BY 
 
Edoh Fofo Afambo 
 
2006 
 
 
Committee chair: Samuel H. Cox 
 
Major Academic Unit: Risk Management and Insurance 
 
 
 
This dissertation investigates the implications of using the Advanced 
Measurement Approaches (AMA) as a method to assess operational risk capital charges 
for banks and insurance companies within Basel II paradigms and with regard to U.S. 
regulations. Operational risk has become recognized as a major risk class because of huge 
operational losses experienced by many financial firms over the last past decade. Unlike 
market risk, credit risk, and insurance risk, for which firms and scholars have designed 
efficient methodologies, there are few tools to help analyze and quantify operational risk. 
The New Basel Revised Framework for International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II) gives substantial flexibility to 
internationally active banks to set up their own risk assessment models in the context of 
 vii
the Advanced Measurement Approaches. The AMA developed in this thesis uses 
actuarial loss models complemented by the extreme value theory to determine the 
empirical probability distribution function of the overall capital charge in terms of 
various classes of copulas. Publicly available operational risk loss data set is used for the 
empirical exercise. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
A look inside the banking industry over the last decade clearly reveals two stylized facts. 
On the one hand, increasing complexity of financial technology combined with 
deregulation and globalization trends have made banking practices more sophisticated 
and challenging. As a result, the industry faced new multifaceted risks envisioned as part 
of ‘other risks’ and as such, different from market and credit risk. These include system 
security and fraud risks arising from the expansion of e-commerce, system failure risks 
on account of the use of highly automated technology, and many other significant risks 
resulting from the increased use of outsourcing arrangements and new risk mitigation 
techniques such as credit derivatives, swaps, and asset securitization (BCBS, 2003c). On 
the other hand, the banking industry all over the world has witnessed a growing number 
of insolvencies and experienced high-profile ‘other risks’ losses. In 1998, the press 
reported more than US$20 billion of ‘other risk’ losses in financial service firms, 
including the insurance industry. These combined facts brought supervisors as well as 
banking and insurance executives to view the management of these ‘other risks’ as a 
comprehensive practice comparable to the management of credit and market risk (BCBS, 
2003c). 
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In the quest for solutions to issues raised by these challenging ‘other risks’ faced 
by the banking industry, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (the Committee) 
set up, in its June 1999 First Consultative Package, the principle of developing a Pillar 
One explicit capital charge for ‘other risks’, such as operational risk. Subsequent to the 
consultation process and its own analysis, the Committee adopted a definition of 
operational risk in its January 2001 Second Consultative Package and decided that only 
this specific risk should be subject to capital charges under Pillar One of the Framework 
(Minimum Regulatory Capital Requirements). Additional components of other risks such 
as interest rate risk and liquidity risk will be addressed only through Pillar Two 
(Supervisory Review Process) and Pillar Three (Market Discipline)1.  
The definition of operational risk, formulated by the British Bankers’ Association 
(BBA) was refined in the September 2001 Working Paper on the Regulatory Treatment 
of Operational Risk, as follows: “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people and systems, or from external events”. The Committee 
specified that the aforementioned definition encompasses legal risk but excludes 
systemic, strategic, and reputational risks for the purpose of a minimum regulatory 
operational risk capital requirement. 
There exist four computational methodologies to determine the regulatory capital 
requirements for financial institutions. These include fixed ratios, risk-based capital, 
scenario-based approaches2, and probabilistic approaches (IAIS, 2000). In many views 
                                                 
1  The Committee believes that, taken together, these three elements (Minimum Regulatory Capital 
Requirements, Supervisory Review, and Market Discipline) are the essential pillars of an effective 
capital framework (BCBS, 1999). 
2  Under the fixed ratio method, the capital requirement is expressed as a fixed proportion of a proxy for 
exposure to risk often an item from the insurer’s balance sheet or profit and loss account. 
Under the risk-based capital model, results are determined by applying factors to exposure proxies such 
as invested assets risks, reserving risks, just like in the fixed ratio model. 
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(see for example IAIS, 2000; KMPG, 2002), probabilistic approaches such as the 
Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA), provide the preferred greatest framework for 
a meaningful capital requirement characterization.  These methodologies use simulations 
to determine the full probability distribution of possible outcomes from which the capital 
requirement is determined using ruin-probability, expected policyholder approaches 
(Butsic, 1994) or other risk measures. As such, probabilistic methodologies are the most 
complex of the four approaches to assessing regulatory capital charges in terms of 
consistency, codification, and data requirements. Their complexity is also reflected in 
large costs associated with their application (KMPG, 2002).  
As to the operational risk, it has been assumed that this specific risk will be more 
accurately captured under the AMA3 and, therefore, incentives in terms of a lower capital 
charge granted to AMA applicant banks that refine and develop sound operational risk 
methodologies (Fitch, 2004). However, due to the specificity of this major risk class, 
there is no clear idea about the actual implications for using the AMA as a method to 
assess operational risk capital charges and, importantly, how its implementation would 
ultimately result in a lower capital charge for financial institutions that adopt it. 
According to a survey carried out by Fitch in 2004, forty-two large banks around the 
world believe that the AMA may generate capital charges that are not lower than those 
under the standardized or basic indicator approaches (Fitch, 2004). 
As of today, there is a small body of literature that focuses on how the AMA 
should be effectively implemented in financial institutions. Literature on AMA can be 
                                                                                                                                                 
KMPG (2002) describes scenario-based model as a methodology that explores the impact of specific 
risk variables to company specific exposure. 
3  The two other approaches include the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA) set according to the fixed ratio 
methodology and the Standardized Approach (TSA) established according to the risk-based capital 
approach.   
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traced only as far back as 2001 when the Committee published its document “Working 
Paper on the Regulatory Treatment of Operational Risk” in September 2001. With regard 
to the AMA-related academic literature, Embrechts et al. (2003), Chavez-Demoulin et al. 
(2004b), Embrechts et al. (2004), and Neslehova et al. (2006) question the ability of the 
standard actuarial model4 as well as extreme value theory5 to adequately address AMA 
issues because the assumptions behind these models are barely in line with the actual 
characteristics of operational risk losses. The authors consider models that include the 
particular case of the Cramer-Lundberg model6, and general risk processes where the 
underlying intensity model follows a finite state Markov chain, allowing the modeling of 
underlying changes in the economy. In line with Embrechts et al., Chernobai and Rachev 
(2004) advocate for the use of the compound Cox model7 or the alpha-stable distribution 
model8 instead of the simple compound Poisson process9.  
As it appears, nearly all of these models suggest approaches which are more 
appropriate for large data sets without significant reporting bias. As a result, there is a 
need for more formal empirical research about operational risk capital requirements, 
taking into account various constraints in terms of data availability, data collection costs, 
limited computational resources, and  limited decision time. 
On the practitioners’ side, Frachot et al. (2001),  Frachot et al. (2002),  and Baud 
et al. (2002) describe the Loss Distribution Approach (LDA) for operational loss and 
provide a methodology that allows banks to pool  internal data with external data to 
                                                 
4  Klugman et al. (2004). 
5  Embrects et al. (1997). 
6  See Embrects et al. (1997). 
7  See Cox et al. (1980). 
8  Zolotarev (1994), Embrechts et al., (1997), Rachev, S. Mittnik, S.  (2000), Nolan (2001). 
9  See Rolski et al. (1998). 
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estimate operational risk capital charge. Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) use the 
aforementioned methodology to provide preliminary empirical evidence on how publicly 
available operational loss data could be used to calibrate large loss severity probability 
distribution functions and capital charges. In their model, the random truncation point 
used to account for the reporting biases that plague this specific dataset is assumed to be 
logistically distributed. This assumption highly impacts the underlying loss severity 
distribution function and even though it is computationally convenient, it has been 
criticized on the account that it is not grounded on empirical evidence (Leandri, 2003). In 
addition, the dependency across risk categories is not accounted for. Di Clemente et al 
(2003) develop a model that considers a dependence structure based on the Student’s t-
copula and historical rank correlations. The empirical exercise, however, is carried out 
using catastrophe insurance loss data of three different lines – namely, hurricane, wind-
storm, and flood. As such, the authors do not consider actual operational risk loss data 
issues.  The next subsection presents my main contributions and the structure of the 
thesis.  
 
1.2 Contributions and Organization of the Dissertation 
 
My research objective is to investigate the implications of using the AMA to address 
operational risk capital charge modeling issues with regard to Basel II and US 
Regulations. More specifically, this dissertation examines the extent to which the four 
key elements of the AMA10 could be incorporated into a model that has the potential to 
capture the relationship between the adequacy of capital and the quality of risk 
                                                 
10  These elements include internal data, external data, scenario analysis, and business environment and 
control factor. 
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management (Caruana, 2003).  For the empirical exercise, my work extends the 
methodology proposed in Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) that derives operational loss severity 
probability distribution function for large losses as well as the required capital charges. 
As mentioned in the preceding section, these authors use publicly available operational 
losses to design a model based on Extreme Value Theory (EVT) and random truncation 
point to estimate the loss severity probability distribution function that could be relevant 
to internationally active banks. The above-cited model requires using a convolution of 
distribution functions, and as such, is computationally intensive. In view of the foregoing 
concern, my research produced an efficient symbolic computational paradigm that 
facilitates the calibration of the parameters of the model. Within this symbolic 
framework, I provide answers to a key issue that involves calibrating the parameters of 
the loss severity to reflect specific firm size, rating, internal control environment as well 
as market-related factors. Finally, my work lead to a methodology based on upper tail 
dependence properties of elliptical copulas, and finite mixture distribution analysis to 
determine the empirical probability distribution function of the overall capital charge by 
means of Monte Carlo simulation runs. As a result, this latter paradigm also accounts for 
the quality of firm internal control environment through the weight assigned to each type 
of copula.  
Using the wording of Fitch (2003), one may claim that the proposed approach 
provides incentives in terms of a lower capital charge to AMA applicant banks and 
insurance companies that refine and develop sound operational risk methodologies.  
Indeed, this dissertation clearly reveals that operational risk losses are driven by two loss 
event types - namely, Clients, Products and Businesses Practices on the one hand, and 
 7
Internal Fraud on the other hand. As a result, the quality of firm internal control 
environment appears as a key factor that significantly impacts the loss severity 
distribution and thereby the capital charge. Overall, my framework actually provides 
preliminary answers to some major concerns raised by regulators, scholars and 
practitioners as summarized in Fitch (2003). A crucial future consideration is to set up a 
paradigm that could accurately quantify the quality of firm internal control environment 
with regard to Pillar 2, Pillar 3, Sarbanes-Oxley Act11, and Risk-Focused Surveillance 
Framework12. 
 The structure of the dissertation is as follows. After this general introduction that 
explains why operational risk has become a major risk class, chapter 2 reviews the BCBS 
literature relevant to the topic as well as the literature from scholars and practitioners.  
Chapter 3 describes the model used to perform the simulation runs while chapter 4 
presents the empirical procedure and the key results. Finally chapter 5 gives the 
concluding remarks. 
Chapter 2 begins by concisely exploring the rationale for banking and insurance 
solvency regulation. Next, section 2.1 sketches out the evolution of the Basel Accord 
from 1988 to 2004 and explains the rationale for the move from the Cooke ratio that 
addresses credit risk capital issues toward the current McDonough ratio that addresses 
market, credit and operational risk capital requirements. Subsequently, the regulatory 
framework for the U.S. insurance undertaking is explored. Section 2.2 reviews the 
literature devoted to the computational aspects of the AMA. Specifically, subsection 
2.2.1 describes the three approaches set forth by BCBS to address AMA issues. 
                                                 
11 See Sarbanes-Oxley (2002). 
12 See NAIC (2004). 
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Subsection 2.2.2 examines the relevant literature that deals with operational risk 
emerging practices and related issues from both practitioners and scholars. 
Chapter 3 concentrates on the model used to determine the empirical probability 
distribution function of the overall capital charge. Section 3.2 mathematically describes 
the capital charge formulation under the BCBS requirements while section 3.3 is 
dedicated to the Loss Distribution Approach. With regard to this latter model, the basic 
framework –namely, the Cramer-Lundberger model is first described, and next the point 
process methodology envisioned as a promising extension of the basic model is covered, 
notably, the new  results from Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005) and Pfeifer and Neslehova 
(2004). Subsection 3.3.2 focuses on the methodology proposed by Fontnouvelle et al. 
(2003) to extract both the observed and underlying loss severities from the publicly 
available operational loss data. Subsection 3.3.2.1 presents the above-cited approach, its 
symbolic implementation is described in subsection 3.3.2.2, and finally an extension of 
the model to account for specific firm size, rating, internal control environment as well as 
market-related factors is set forth in subsection 3.3.2.3. Subsection 3.3.3 considers the 
loss frequency distribution modeling. First, the calibration of this distribution is tackled 
through a risk assessment exercise as mentioned in Fontnouvelle et al. (2003). Next a 
basic common Poisson shock model suggested by Powojowski et al. (2002) and 
mentioned in Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005) is explored. 
Subsection 3.3.4 discusses some dependence structure issues that are considered 
when it comes to determine the overall capital charge. Indeed, within the BCBS 
framework, banks are required to estimate the capital charge for each of the 56 business 
line/event type and use a dependence structure model to aggregate these values. Since 
 9
copulas provide more significant information on dependence structure than the 
conventional Pearson correlation, various families of copulas are examined with 
particular emphasis on copulas of extreme dependence and elliptical copulas. Finally, 
Subsection 3.3.5 uses upper tail dependence properties of elliptical copulas as well as 
finite mixture distribution analysis to express the overall capital charge as a mixing 
weighted capital charges.  
Chapter 4 deals with the empirical investigation in the context of publicly 
available operational losses. Section 4.2 highlights some key descriptive statistics and 
motivates the risk classification schemes within which loss severities are calibrated and 
capital charges determined. Section 4.3 discusses the calibration of the parameters of the 
loss severity distribution using three distributional assumptions for the random truncation 
point. Finally, section 4.4 presents the descriptive statistics as well as the histogram of the 
empirical probability distribution function (that accounts for the randomness of the 
Monte Carlo simulation runs) of the overall capital charge.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As a starting point for the literature review, we will briefly explore the rationale for 
banking and insurance solvency regulation and outline the development of the Agreed 
Framework of the Committee as well as the U.S. Risk Based Capital framework. 
Subsequently, diverse strands of the literature will be surveyed and discussed.  
 
2.1 The Regulatory Framework 
 
2.1.1 Rationale for Banking and Insurance Solvency Regulation  
 
The three alternative views of bank supervision, as mentioned in Barth et al. (2003), 
include the “helping hand” view, the “grabbing hand” vision (Becker and Stigler, 1974; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1998), and the “private monitoring” view (Haber, 2003). 
Specifically, the helping hand view emphasizes market failures while the grabbing hand 
view highlights political failures - politicians may take advantage of powerful 
supervisory agencies to compel banks to lend to privileged borrowers. The “private 
monitoring” view is a compromise that encompasses the “grabbing hand” view as well as 
“the helping hand” (Barth et al., 2003). In the sequel, we elaborate on the “the helping 
hand” vision which is commonly referred to as the public interest theory of regulation. 
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According to the public interest theory of regulation (see for example Stigler, 
1971 and Posner, 1974), governments enforce regulation when free markets fail to 
allocate resource efficiently. For financial institutions, externalities and government 
guarantees13  have the potential to create market failure, and thereby provide a rationale 
for government intervention. With regard to the banking industry, externalities in terms 
of systemic risk are defined by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) as "the risk 
that the failure of a participant to meet its contractual obligations may in turn cause other 
participants to default with a chain reaction leading to broader financial difficulties". 
Systemic events like bank runs14 can inflict significant social costs on the affected 
economies, by disrupting inter-bank and foreign credit relations. As a result, 
identification and close monitoring of systemic risks are higher priority on the policy 
agenda of central bankers. 
Government guarantees for bank deposits partly eliminate the rationale for bank 
runs and protect small depositors who cannot effectively monitor their bank because of 
the high costs involved. Early on, public policymakers, as well as scholars15, focused on 
issues involved in this specific guarantee. Recent empirical studies revealed a strong and 
robust link between the generosity of the deposit insurance system and bank fragility16. 
Generous deposit insurance schemes lessen market discipline enforcement and 
create a moral hazard issue, since there is a potential incentive for banks to engage in 
                                                 
13  Government guarantees include the deposit insurance for the banking industry and the guaranty fund for 
the insurance industry. 
14  By definition, bank runs is caused by depositors trying to withdraw their assets from the bank to avoid a 
loss of capital (Dionne , 2003). 
15  See for example Merton (1977). 
16  Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2003), Barth et al. (2003). 
 12
higher-risk activities because the cost of the deposit insurance premium is not related to 
their risk taking-activity17. 
Thus, the rationale for controlling a bank’s risk-taking activities stems from an 
asymmetric information issue, due to the existence of deposit insurance. Banking 
supervisors accomplish this control by performing solvency assessments that require, 
among other things, banks to carry minimum levels of capital that act as a cushion to 
protect the insurance fund. In this regard, the 1988 Basle Accord framed under the 
chairmanship of W.P. Cooke provided the first decisive step toward efficient banking 
regulation for internationally active banks.  
 With regard to the U.S. banking industry, in 1989, the three banking agencies18 
(the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC)) and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) adopted a common regulatory 
framework that establishes minimum capital adequacy ratios for commercial banks, in 
line with the 1988 Basle Accord. 
As to the insurance industry, Cummins et al. (1995) mention that the rationale for 
insurance solvency regulation includes the difficulty for the insured to really monitor  the 
insurer solvency due to the complexity of the insurance activity and the likelihood that 
insurers could increase risk following policy issuance, particularly, if the interests of the 
new policyholders and existing policyholders diverge. Also included is the existence of 
                                                 
17  See Cull et al. (2004), Barth et al. (2003). 
18  At the federal level, the Federal Reserve has primary supervisory responsibility for state-chartered 
banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System, as well as for all bank holding companies and 
certain operations of foreign banking organizations. The FDIC has primary responsibility for state 
nonmember banks and FDIC supervised savings banks. National banks are supervised by the OCC. The 
OTS has primary responsibility for savings and loan associations (The Federal Reserve Board (1999)). 
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non-risk-rated guaranty fund19 coverage that provides insurers with the possibility to 
increase the value of owners’ equity by engaging in riskier activities without being 
penalized by the market (Cummins, 1988).  
Just as banks hold capital to protect the insurance fund, so do insurers carry 
minimum levels of capital to protect the guaranty fund. However, as pointed out by 
Medova et al. (2004), “an optimal balance must be struck between holding economic 
capital to ensure solvency and its cost, in order to provide a decent return on equity for 
shareholders”20.  
 
2.1.2   Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Framework: From the 
Cooke Ratio to the McDonough Ratio  
 
In July 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released its report 
“International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards”. In many 
regards, the paper that became known as the 1988 Basel Capital Accord was a milestone 
(Caruana, 2003). Indeed, for the first time, the Group of Ten (G-10)21 banking 
supervisory authorities set up an agreed framework for establishing minimum levels of 
capital, in relation to credit risk, for internationally active banks. Essentially, the 1988 
Accord aims at reinforcing the soundness and stability of the international banking 
system and “diminishing an existing source of competitive inequality among international 
banks” (BCBS, 1988). Typically, within this new framework, a weighted risk ratio 
                                                 
19  State guaranty funds require solvent insurers to pay losses of insolvent firms. Guaranty fund coverage 
weakens the market incentive for insureds to monitor insurers’ solvency (Cummins et al., 1995). 
20  See also Merton and Perold (1993), Froot and Stein (1998), Perold (2001). 
21  The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision comprises representatives of the central banks and 
supervisory authorities of the Group of Ten countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States) and Luxembourg. The Committee 
meets at the Bank for International Settlements, Basle, Switzerland. 
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known as the Cooke ratio or risk asset ratio (RAR), requires international banks to hold 
capital at least equal to 8 percent of their reported risk-weighted assets.  
The Committee set up the components of the regulatory capital in two equally-
weighted tiers. These include tier 1 - the core capital, comprised of equity capital and 
disclosed reserves, tier 2 - the supplementary capital, consisted of other elements of 
capital such as undisclosed reserves, reevaluation reserves, general provisions and 
general loss reserves, hybrid debt capital instruments and subordinated term debt.  
With regard to the ratios that could appropriately assess bank capital adequacy, 
the Committee expressed the view that the weighted risk ratio in which capital is tied to 
different classes of asset and off-balance sheet exposure, weighted according to some risk 
categories, was the best method for making such an assessment. Three facts underpinned 
the Committee choice over a more regular gearing ratio methodology. Firstly, risk ratio 
facilitates comparisons between heterogeneous international banking systems in that it 
offers a more adequate basis for assessment.  Secondly, this specific ratio permits off-
balance-sheet exposures to be included more smoothly into the capital measurement 
framework. Thirdly, the risk ratio does not prevent banks from holding assets deemed to 
be low risk such as cash or claims on central governments and central banks. The 
Committee kept as simple as possible the weighting structure by allowing only five 
weights i.e. 0, 10, 20, 50 and 100 percent.  The weighting structure for on-balance-sheet 
assets items is set out in the Appendix 1, Table A1. 
As to the level of the weighted risk ratio, in light of consultations and pilot testing 
of the framework, the Committee agreed that the proposed ratio of capital to weighted 
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risk assets should be set at 8 percent. International active banks in member countries had 
been expected to achieve the target ratio by the end of 1992. 
Regarding capital requirements for the U.S. banking and thrift agencies, CAS 
(1992) mentions that, in 1986, US banking regulatory agencies issued a risk-based capital 
proposal that had been criticized on the grounds that without a comparable framework for 
foreign players, U.S. banks would suffer from a competitive disadvantage.  In view of the 
foregoing concerns, in 1987, the US banking regulatory agencies and the Bank of 
England examined various issues involved in such approaches and set out a joint 
proposal. Afterward, in 1988, the Basle Committee refined this proposal and expanded it 
to incorporate the G-10 member countries. In the U.S., the FRB, the OCC, the OTS and 
the FDIC implemented risk-based capital standards that were in line with the 1988 Basle 
Capital Accord.  
On many accounts, the 1988 Basel Capital Accord was a great success story 
(Caruana, 2003). It has been adopted in over 100 countries and the Cooke ratio has come 
to be recognized as a popular yardstick to quantify a bank’s capital adequacy. The 
rationale for its success was perhaps its simplicity that arose from the fact that the G-10 
governments as well as the financial communities were eager to release a straightforward 
applicable framework that could revert the downward trend in international active bank 
capitalization (Caruana, 2003). Indeed, during the mid-80’s, the capital of the world’s 
major banks had become dangerously low after continual erosion through competition 
(BCBS, 2001a). Another reason for its success might stem from the fact that the Accord 
has been set out in the aftermath of serious disturbances in equity markets: on Monday, 
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October 19, 1987 US Stock collapsed by 23 percent, wiping out US$ 1 trillion in capital 
(Hong, 2003). 
In the years since 1988, the weaknesses of the simple approach to capital 
regulation have come to light. As a matter of fact, the 1988 Accord has suffered from 
many criticisms, the most obvious being that it did not adequately address off-balance 
sheet exposures on market risk in particular risks associated with the bank’s positions in 
derivatives. In addition, it did not account for portfolio diversification effects, netting 
effects and the borrower’s credit rating. Indeed, taking into account correlations between 
risk categories of the portfolio may lower total portfolio risk while matching lenders and 
borrowers may decrease bank’s net exposure (Jorion, 1997).  Another shortcoming of the 
1988 Accord was that it tended to support transactions and investments whose sole 
benefits were regulatory arbitrage. Investments in costly but better risk management 
without tangible regulatory capital relief were not fully realized. CAS (1992) mentions 
that studies in the Wall Street Journal indicate that the new capital requirement, soon 
after its implementation in the U.S., triggered many banks to change their investment 
policies by moving assets out of corporate loans (which carry the maximum 100 percent 
risk weight) into government securities (which require 0 percent risk weight). As a result, 
the market witnessed a decrease in bank lending and the FRB discussed the possibility of 
facilitating some of the capital requirements. In this regard, under the risk-based capital 
guidelines, the FRB may modify the rules in order to reflect significant changes in the 
economy, financial markets, banking practices, etc. 
Over the past decade, the state-of-the-art in measuring and managing risk has 
made tremendous progress in ways the builders of the 1988 Accord could not have 
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foreseen (Caruana, 2004). The explosive growth in the markets for credit derivatives and 
for securitized assets and liabilities has provided banks with new ways to manage and 
transfer credit risk. Advances in technology and telecommunications have changed the 
way that banks process data on their exposures. In response to these aforementioned 
criticisms and challenging innovations, the Committee issued a series of amendments to 
provide banks and their supervisors with sound measures of the actual risks they face.  
In the quest for addressing risks other than credit risk, in January 1996, the 
Committee issued its paper “Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate Market 
Risks”.  Through this amendment, the Committee set up capital requirements for market 
risks arising from banks' open positions in foreign exchange, traded debt securities, 
equities, commodities and options. Two alternative approaches to the measurement of 
this specific risk have been proposed, namely the standardized method and the internal 
models approach.  The capital charge under the standardized measurement method has 
been set out as an arithmetic sum of specific measures of the five risk categories 
addressed by the Committee.  
Through internal models that reflected practices in leading financial institutions, 
the Committee has allowed banks to use their own qualified risk assessment models to 
determine their capital charge. In many regards, this approach has been a ground-
breaking step forward in banking regulation.  
Using a models-based methodology requires banks to satisfy minimum qualitative 
and quantitative standards. Qualitative standards include, among other things, the design 
and implementation of the bank's risk management system by an independent risk control 
unit, as well as a periodic independent review of the risk measurement system. The 
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minimum quantitative standards involve, among other things, the computation of value- 
at-risk (VaR) as a risk metric, to quantify bank's exposure according to the following: 
• Value-at-risk are computed with a holding period of 10 trading days or 
two calendar weeks, at the 99th percentile, with an historical observation 
period constrained to a minimum length of one year. 
• Empirical correlations within risk categories as well as across risk 
categories may be recognized. 
• Each bank has to meet, on a daily basis, a capital requirement expressed 
as the maximum between its previous day's value-at-risk and an average 
of the daily value-at-risk measures on each of the preceding sixty 
business days, multiplied by a factor. The multiplication factor (set to a 
minimum value of 3) has to be determined by the supervisor and 
adjusted according to back-testing results.  
The rationale of this practice is to give incentives to banks to improve the predictive 
accuracy of their model. 
In addition to the above minimum qualitative and quantitative standards, the 
Committee set out three other requirements for the use of internal models. These were:  
• The selection of a suitable set of market risk factors, that is the market 
prices and rates that impact the value of the bank's on-and off-balance-
sheet trading positions. 
• The use of stress testing scenarios as stress testing to capture events that 
could significantly impact banks is a major exercise in assessing bank's 
capital position. 
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•  An external validation of models' accuracy by external auditors and/or 
supervisory authorities.   
To calculate the total capital-adequacy requirements, the credit-risk charge is 
added to the market-risk charge. The eligible capital to cover market risks includes tier 1 
capital and tier 2 capital as defined in the 1988 Accord. Also included (at the discretion 
of the national authority) is tier 3 capital consisting of short-term subordinated debt.  Tier 
3 capital is restricted to approximately 70 percent of an institution’s measure for market 
risk.     
In a quest to push further forward its responsiveness to financial innovation and 
developments in risk management practices, the Committee released in July 1999 its 
consultative paper “A New Capital Adequacy Framework”. According to William J. 
McDonough, previous chairman of the Basel Committee, the key objective of the New 
Accord is to strengthen the stability of the global financial system. To achieve this 
objective, the New Basel Accord implements goals that consist, among other things, of 
“capturing the relationship between the adequacy of capital and the quality of risk 
management by relying on three mutually reinforcing pillars” (Caruana, 2003). These 
include, minimum capital requirements, supervisory review, and market discipline. In the 
sequel, we review the position of Jaime Caruana (the current chairman of the Basel 
Committee) on the objective of the three pillars. 
Essentially, the first pillar aims at matching capital requirements more closely 
with actual risks banks incur. For instance, the Advanced Measurement Approaches to 
operational risk build on the bank’s internal loss data and allows banks to rely on their 
own assessments of risk to calculate how much capital to hold. As a result, economic 
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incentives in terms of lower capital charges are granted to banks that appropriately assess 
their exposures and develop better techniques for managing their risks. In addition to 
performing that match, pillar 1 seeks to achieve convergence between economic capital 
and regulatory capital.  
Through the second pillar, supervisors will be accountable for evaluating the 
internal processes banks employ to determine their need for capital. By engaging 
managers in a discussion about the risks they incur and the controls they have adopted to 
address them, supervisors create incentives for managers to act prudently.   
The third pillar uses the market itself to provide discipline to banks to make sure 
that they are not holding low levels of capital. This is achieved by making the banks’ 
public reporting of their risks as well as measures taken to control such risks, available to 
investors and customers. This generates a strong incentive for bank management to 
enhance their handling of those risks. 
As a result, these three pillars, taken together, aim at providing incentives to 
banks to get a more accurate recognition of the risks they incur and take preemptive 
actions to protect themselves against those risks by means of their control structures and 
their holdings of capital (Caruana 2003). To make certain that the risks within an entire 
banking group are considered, the New Accord is extended on a consolidated basis to 
holding companies of banking groups. 
After pilot testing of the proposed new Framework and large consultations with 
the financial community worldwide, the Committee issued on June 26, 2004, its final 
report  “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A 
Revised Framework”. The Central Bank Governors as well as the Heads of Banking 
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Supervision of the G-10 countries have endorsed the Framework and the Standard it 
contains.  
Under the Agreed Framework (also referred to as Revised Framework or Basel 
II), Pillar 1, covers regulatory capital requirements for market, credit and operational risk. 
Three key elements characterize the minimum capital. These are, the definition of 
regulatory capital, the risk weighted assets and the minimum ratio of capital to risk 
weighted assets. With regard to the definition of the eligible regulatory capital, it remains 
the same as the one set out in the 1988 Accord, and refined in the 27 October 1998 press 
release on instruments eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capital. The total risk weighted 
assets is calculated by multiplying the capital requirements for market risk and 
operational risk by 12.5 (i.e. the reciprocal of the minimum capital ratio of 8 percent) and 
adding the resulting figures to the sum of risk-weighted assets calculated for credit risk. 
The capital ratio (also referred to as the McDonough ratio) is simply the ratio of the 
regulatory capital to the total risk weighted assets. The ratio must be no lower than 8 
percent for total capital. Tier 2 capital will continue to be limited to 100 percent of Tier 1 
capital. Tier 3 capital remains restricted to approximately 70 percent of an institution’s 
measure for market risk. 
 To enhance risk sensitivity, the Committee offers a variety of options for 
addressing both credit and operational risk. As to credit risk, the range of options includes 
the standardized approach, a foundation internal ratings-based approach (IRB), and an 
advanced IRB approach. Regarding operational risk minimum capital requirements, the 
Committee recommends several approaches that reflect those of credit and market risk. 
These include three methods in the continuum of increasing sophistication and risk 
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sensitivity (BCBS, 2001): the Basic Indicator Approach (BIA), the Standardized 
Approach (TSA) and the Advanced Measurement Approaches (AMA). 
Banks adopting the Basic Indicator Approach are required to hold capital for 
operational risk that amounts to the average over the previous three years of a fixed 
percentage (termed alpha) of positive annual gross income. The level of the parameter 
alpha has been set to 15 percent following the Quantitative Impact Survey (QIS) data 
analysis. Gross income is defined as net interest income plus net non-interest income. 
The Committee has not set any special requirement for use of the Basic Indicator. 
The Standardized Approach is based on a three-stage calculation. The starting 
point consists of allocating the bank’s previous three-year gross income into eight 
standard business lines. Then, for each business line, operational risk capital requirement 
is calculated as in the BIA case but with the business line specific factor (beta factor). 
The computation ends with calculating the total operational risk capital requirement as 
the sum of the individual business line operational risk capital requirements. The business 
lines with their respective beta factors are reported in Appendix 1 Table A2. 
If a bank is primarily active in Retail or Commercial Banking business lines, the 
Committee authorizes the use of the Alternative Standardized Approach (ASA) instead of 
the TSA. For these two specific business lines, the relevant exposure indicator is the 
three-year average of the total nominal amount of loans and advances for each business 
line multiplied by 0.035.  
The qualifying criteria for the use of the Standardized Approach as well as the 
Alternative Standardized Approach include, among other things, the involvement of the 
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board of directors and senior management in the oversight of the operational risk 
management process.  
As to the AMA, the operational risk regulatory capital requirement under this 
approach is drawn from the bank’s own internal operational risk measurement system. 
The use of the AMA is subject to regulatory approval and some specific qualitative and 
quantitative standards need to be met. 
Qualitative standards essentially require that an AMA applicant bank must 
integrate its internal operational risk measurement framework into its day-to-day risk 
management systems (FSA, 2005), and create an independent risk management function 
for operational risk.  
Quantitative standards involve the following: first, banks can base the minimum 
regulatory capital requirement on unexpected losses alone if they succeed in 
demonstrating to the satisfaction of the national supervisor that their expected loss 
exposure is measured and accounted for; second, the operational risk measure should 
meet a soundness standard comparable to the IRB approach for Credit Risk, that is, one-
year holding period and 99.9 percent confidence; third, operational risk measurement 
must include  four key elements - namely, internal data, external data, scenario analysis 
and business environment and control factors. 
The Committee envisions internal data as essential for relating risk estimates to 
loss experience. This is carried out by using internal loss as the basis of empirical risk 
estimates.  
A bank's internal loss collection processes must meet sound standards in order to 
qualify for regulatory capital purposes. These include the mapping of its historical 
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internal loss data into the supervisory categories of business lines and loss event types, 
the design of a comprehensive dataset accounting for different types of exposures, and 
geographic locations. Also included are the choice of an appropriate threshold, dates of 
events, any recoveries of gross loss amounts, as well as descriptive information about 
drivers or causes of loss events. Banks must design specific criteria for allocating loss 
data stemming from events or activities that extend over many business lines, as well as 
from related events over time.  
The Committee requires AMA applicants to use a minimum five-year observation 
period of internal loss data to generate risk measures for regulatory capital purposes. A 
three-year historical data window is sufficient for the first application of the AMA. 
To address internal loss data intrinsic weaknesses such as data gaps and 
backwards-looking measure of exposure, the Committee requires the use of external data, 
scenario analysis, business environment, and internal control factors. 
Concerning external data, the Committee recommends the use of relevant external 
data to supplement internal data, each time an AMA applicant bank is exposed to 
infrequent, yet potentially severe losses. Requirements for the use of external data include 
information on the scale of business operations where the event occurred, information on 
the causes and circumstances of the loss events as well as information that would help in 
assessing the significance of the loss event for other banks. 
The conditions and practices for external data use, notably the pooling 
methodologies must be well-documented and subject to periodic independent review.   
The Committee requires an AMA applicant bank to employ scenario analysis of 
expert opinion associated with external data to evaluate the bank’s exposure to high 
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severity events. Typically, scenario analysis uses the knowledge of experienced business 
managers and risk management experts to derive consistent assessments of plausible 
severe losses. Examples of uses of this methodology include assessment of potential 
losses occurring from simultaneous operational risk loss events as well as assignment of 
values to parameters of assumed statistical loss distributions. A specificity of this 
approach is that banks need to constantly ensure the accuracy of assessments with respect 
to actual loss experience.  
The Committee requires banks to include into their risk assessment methodology 
key business environment and internal control factors that have an impact on their 
operational risk profile. Control factors strengthen bank’s risk assessments in many ways. 
Besides being more forward-looking, they make capital assessments reflect risk 
management objectives, and above all, they account for enhancements and declines in 
operational risk profiles quickly. The use of these factors in a bank’s risk measurement 
framework is subject to some standards. First, banks have to motivate the choice of each 
factor as a significant driver of risk. Second, the link between bank’s risk estimates and 
factors and the relative weighting of the various factors should be well conceptualized. 
Third, over time, banks need to contrast the assessment estimates with actual internal loss 
experience, external data, and make suitable amendments. 
Internally determined correlations and dependencies in operational risk losses are 
recognized for the use of the AMA. With regard to risk mitigation issues, AMA applicant 
banks will be allowed to take into account the risk mitigating impact of insurance in 
operational risk measurement up to 20 percent of the total operational risk capital charge 
calculated under the AMA. 
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With regard to U.S. banking regulations, recent legislation that aims to infuse a 
great deal of discipline within the banking system and financial markets include (1) the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), (2) the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA), and (3) the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX)22. Now, we review the capital requirement literature in connection with the 
U.S. insurance industry. 
 
2.1.3 Regulatory Capital Framework for the U.S. Insurance Undertakings 
 
In the United States, state insurance regulators came together in 1871 to create the 
National Association of Insurance Commissioners to address the need to coordinate 
regulation of multistate insurers (NAIC, 2005). In many regards23, the development of 
insurance risk-based capital (RBC) requirements stemmed from the report "Failed 
Promises: Insurance Company Insolvencies" issued in February, 1990, by the 
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the U.S. House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce - the Dingell Committee (U.S. House of Representatives, 1990). 
Essentially, this Committee investigated U.S. insurer insolvencies during the mid-1980 as 
well as various deficiencies in the existing solvency regulatory system. Reflecting the 
Dingell Committee‘s work and proposals, in December 1992, the NAIC adopted a life-
health insurer risk-based capital framework and model law that entered into force with 
the 1993 annual statement filed in March 1994. Similarly, a property-liability insurer 
                                                 
22  FDICIA was passed in the wake of the Savings & Loan disastrous decline, SOX was enacted in reaction 
to pervasive corporate malfeasance, such as events at Enron, Tyco, and WorldCom. GLBA was written 
to modernize financial regulation and also to fight personal identity theft (BITS Operational Risk 
Management Working Group, 2005). 
23  See Cummins et al. (1995), Insurance Information Institute (2005) 
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risk-based capital and model law adopted by the NAIC in December 1993 entered into 
force with the 1994 annual statement filed in March 1995.  
Lewis (1998) recognizes that RBC rules help supervisors in taking prompt 
regulatory steps against insurers without court action. Cummins et al. (1995) question 
risk-based capital requirements on the grounds that insolvency risk is hard to quantify in 
that it encompasses various non-tangible factors that are difficult to assess. In addition, 
the insurance market is characterized by many different players in terms of company size 
and organizational form, types of business written and customer specificities. As a result, 
it is inappropriate to specify the correct amount of capital for most insurers through a 
formula. Cummins et al. (1995) carry out an empirical exercise, investigating the 
relationship between the industry insolvency experience and the ratio of actual capital to 
RBC for property-liability insurers from 1989 through 1991. Results indicate that more 
than half of the companies that later failed had RBC ratios outside the mandated ranges 
for regulatory and company action. In addition, RBC models usually fail in predicting 
large firm insolvencies so that accounting for firm size and organizational form improves 
the predictive accuracy of the insolvency risk models. 
SOA (2002) admits that certain risks such as liquidity risk, operational risk, and 
the risk of fraud are difficult to assess through a RBC formula, and as a result, are mostly 
not accounted for in the formula. Brender (2004) assimilates business risk to operational 
risk for life insurers and points out that “this is the area most in need of future 
development in considering insurance required capital. The emphasis will be different 
from that in banking, since the insurance business is not as transaction based as is 
banking.” 
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In terms of operational risk quantification, for the whole insurance industry, 
business risk approximately accounts for 13 percent of the total regulatory capital 
(Rochette, 2005). In the UK, a recent illustrative case developed in GIRO Working Party 
(2004) reveals that operational risk capital charge could approximately amount to 2 
percent of net premiums on average. However, the authors recognize that further work is 
needed to quantify the real impact of operational risk. 
 As of today, the trend in the management and measurement of the operational risk 
within the insurance industry is toward a Basel-based framework. In this regard, the U.S. 
regulating authorities are currently reshaping their methodology for a more efficient 
insurance solvency regulation. In that sense, the new Framework, in tune with Basel II, 
offers a more robust methodology to supervise and assess the solvency of insurers on an 
ongoing basis. Part of the Framework's focus is on the Risk Assessment Matrix “intended 
to be an all-encompassing tool incorporating risk assessment, examination procedures 
and results” (NAIC, 2004). Nine types of risk classes including operational risk24 are 
determined and input in phase two of the Risk Assessment Matrix.  Now we are in a 
position to review the relevant literature that discusses the computational aspects of the 
AMA. 
 
2.2 The Computational Aspects of the AMA 
 
The literature on the AMA started in 2001 when the Committee published its document 
in September 2001 “Working Paper on the Regulatory Treatment of Operational Risk”. 
                                                 
24  NAIC (2004)’s definition of operational risk. “Operational problems such as inadequate information 
systems, breaches in internal controls, fraud, or unforeseen catastrophes will result in a disruption in 
business and financial loss.” 
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In fact, a range of operational risk internal approaches initiated by practitioners emerged 
since 1998 when the Committee issued its report “Operational Risk Management”. This 
report presented the outcome of a working group of thirty major banks from the member 
countries on the management of operational risk. Reflecting these developments, the 
Committee adopted the concept of the AMA through which a bank’s internal mechanism 
for quantifying operational risk may be accepted by the supervisor, subject to a number 
of requirements.  
As of today, there are three strands in the AMA literature. The first strand is 
provided by the Basel Committee itself. The second strand arises from academia (see for 
example Embrechts et al., 2003; Neslehova et al., 2006) and the third strand stems from 
practitioners in the banking industry (see for example Frachot et al., 2001; Shi et al., 
2000; Fontnouvelle et al. 2003). These three strands will be examined in the sequel. 
2.2.1 BCBS Literature  
 
In September 2001, the Basel Committee set out three approaches to addressing AMA 
issues (BCBS, 2001c). These include Internal Measurement Approaches (IMA), Loss 
Distribution Approaches (LDA), and Scorecard Approaches (SA).  Now, we review the 
literature with regard to these approaches. 
Internal Measurement Approaches are based on a two-stage calculation process. 
First, banks derive expected and unexpected losses from estimates of loss frequency and 
severity for various business line/event type combinations, based on internal and external 
loss data. Second, operational risk capital is computed by business line/event type as a 
product of expected losses and factor (referred as to gamma factor) defined by banks but 
subject to regulatory approval. This methodology assumes a fixed and stable relationship 
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between expected losses (the mean of the loss distribution) and unexpected losses (the 
tail of the loss distribution). A non-linear relationship can also be assumed. The total 
capital charge is then calculated as the sum of the capital charge for individual business 
line/event type cell. 
Loss Distribution Approaches involve a four-step calculation.  
• For each business line/risk type cell, AMA applicant banks estimate the 
shape of the distributions of the severity of individual events. This is 
obtained either by imposing specific distributional assumptions as 
lognormal or by using empirical methods as bootstrap and Monte Carlo 
simulation. 
• The distribution of the number of losses for one-year horizon is derived 
for each business line/risk type cell in order to compute the aggregate 
loss and its distribution for the considered period.  
• The capital charges (for each individual business line/event type) 
resulting from the aggregate loss distribution is computed based on a 
high percentile of the loss distribution. 
• The overall capital charge is computed by assuming either perfect 
positive correlation of losses across these cells, or by using other 
aggregation methods that recognize the risk-reducing impact of less-
than-full correlation. In the former case, the total capital charge is 
calculated as the sum of the capital charges for individual business 
line/event type cell. 
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Loss Distribution Approaches differ from Internal Measurement Approaches in 
that they use disaggregated data and tend to assess unexpected losses directly rather than 
via an assumption about the relationship between expected loss and unexpected loss on 
aggregated data basis. As of today, several kinds of Loss Distribution Approach methods 
are being developed and no industry standard has yet emerged. 
The Scorecard Approaches can be conceptualized in two stages. First, banks have 
to determine an initial level of operational risk capital at the firm or business line level. 
Second, this initial level is modified over time by use of scorecards to reflect the 
underlying risk profile and risk control environment of the different business lines.  
Typically, scorecards bring, on a qualitative basis, a forward-looking dimension to the 
capital calculations, by reflecting improvements in the risk control environment that will 
decrease both the frequency and severity of future operational risk losses. 
In terms of methodology, Scorecard Approaches may be rooted in initial 
estimation methods that are identical to those used in Internal Measurement or Loss 
Distribution Approaches. In some cases, it can be based on identification of a number of 
indicators used as proxies for particular risk types within business units/lines. Whatever 
methodology is selected, emphasis on a robust quantitative basis is needed in order to get 
the Scorecard Approaches qualified for the AMA. In addition, the overall size of the 
capital charge has to be based on an accurate analysis of internal and external loss data. 
AMA is still evolving in the banking industry. Prior to implementation of the 
Revised Framework by the end of 2007, the Committee will review leading industry 
practices regarding credible and consistent estimates of potential operational losses as 
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well as the level of capital requirements estimated by the AMA. We now turn to the 
survey of the practitioner and academic literature on the AMA. 
 
2.2.2 Practitioner and Academic Literature  
 
As a starting point for reviewing these strands, we will explore emerging practices in 
operational risk measurement as set out by practitioners from leading banks as discussed 
in the Industry Technical Working Group –ITWG (2003). Subsequently, we will examine 
academics' claims regarding these practices. Next, following Frachot et al. (2003) who 
discuss these methodologies in five steps, the literature review will survey various 
approaches related to each of these steps. These approaches include loss severity 
estimation, loss frequency estimation, capital charge computations, confidence interval, 
and scenario analysis. Finally in line with Cruz (2002), the operational risk back-testing 
analysis will be explored. 
2.2.2.1 Emerging Practices and Related Issues  
 
Relevant literature on operational risk emerging practices includes Frachot et al. (2001), 
Baud et al. (2002), Frachot et al. (2003), ITWG (2003), Embrechts et al. (2003), Chavez-
Demoulin et al. (2004b), Embrechts et al. (2004), Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005), and 
Neslehova et al. (2006). Essentially, the academic literature investigates the prerequisites 
under which practitioners emerging practices hold. 
As mentioned earlier, the AMA consists of three approaches – namely, IMA, 
LDA, and SA. IMA is generally not considered in the literature. As to the SA, Currie 
(2004) points out that there is no conclusive evidence that this model is actually 
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functional and has predictive properties. Holmes (2003) questions its ability to provide 
reliable information about bank risk over time. Concerning the LDA, ITWG (2003) 
provides some insights into the way leading banks envision its implementation. ITWG 
was created in 2000 by operational risk practitioners from leading financial institutions 
around the world25. ITWG’s key objective is to develop and share practical new ideas for 
the quantification of operational risk. Its agreed core approach for operational risk 
measurement is essentially based on the actuarial modeling of operational risk losses, 
notably the LDA. The Bayesian method and the causal modeling are considered as well. 
Specifically, ITWG assumes that operational risk loss data is the most significant 
risk indicator currently available that reflects the specific operational risk profile of each 
bank.  A well-managed bank, because of its effective operational risk management 
processes and tools, will be less exposed to operational risk losses- both expected and 
unexpected. On the other hand, a bank without a robust operational risk management 
control is likely to experience higher losses. As a result, loss data should be used as initial 
input for implementing loss distribution, which will, in turn, be the underlying driver of 
the AMA. ITWG also considers that its basic assumption still allows banks to employ 
various components of the AMA with specific weights when assessing the overall AMA. 
For instance, emphasis could be put on scenario analysis and business environment and 
control factors in the risk assessment of business lines with a heavy-tailed loss 
distribution and a small number of observed losses. Furthermore, the weight attached to 
each element within the overall AMA will be adjusted over time as banks collect more 
reliable data and expand their knowledge in operational risk management. 
                                                 
25  These are: ABN AMRO, Banca Intesa, BNP Paribas, BMO Financial Group, Crédit Lyonnais, 
Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, ING, JP Morgan Chase, RBC Financial Group, Royal Bank of Scotland, San 
Paolo IMI and Sumitomo Mitsui BC. 
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Embrechts et al. (2003) question the ability of LDA to address adequately 
operational risk loss modeling issues by analyzing the impact of LDA on operational risk 
loss classified in two categories - namely, repetitive and stationary, non repetitive and 
non- stationary. First, they discuss a series of prerequisites under which standard actuarial 
methods supplemented with extreme value theory are appropriate for banks when dealing 
with capital charge issues, in the context of operational risk. For standard actuarial 
methods, these preconditions include independently and identically distributed (iid) 
random variables assumptions (which implies data stationarity26), and repetitiveness of 
observations. For the standard extreme value theory, notably the Peak-Over-Threshold 
approach (POT)27, these requirements encompass, among other things, the abundance of 
data over high thresholds, the number of exceedances as a homogeneous Poisson 
process28. Embrechts et al. (2003) point out typical features displayed by operational risk 
losses, notably the data paucity for certain loss event types, irregularities in the 
occurrence times, and the existence of extremes. In addition, certain risks generate non-
repetitive losses (Crouhy et al., 2000). The authors contend that the observed 
irregularities generally appear to go beyond ordinary randomness similar to that of a 
homogeneous Poisson process. As to the non-stationarity, the authors argue that it might 
stem from a sample selection bias like survivorship bias in that the discipline of 
collecting operational risk losses in financial institutions is quite recent. As such, many 
historical losses have not been kept in banks’ datasets. Alternatively, non-stationarity can 
originate from business cycles, economic cycles, management interactions and 
regulation. 
                                                 
26  See Rolski et al. (1998) 
27  See Embrechts et al. (1997) ; McNeil and Siladin, (1997) 
28  See Rolski et al. (1998) 
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Reflecting these non repetitiveness and serial dependence, Embrechts et al. (2003) 
argue that banks need to carry out initial clarifying analysis to find out which business 
line/loss event types are sure candidates for actuarial techniques and POT methods as 
well. They point out that actuarial methods and their enhancements can be used for 
repetitive and stationary losses to assess capital charges. In contrast, for non-repetitive 
and non-stationary losses that significantly endanger the existence of banks, Basel’s pillar 
1 is inefficient so that pillar 2 and 3 should be considered and enforced.  
Moving forward the theoretical framework of operational risk measurement, 
Chavez-Demoulin and Embrechts (2004b) discuss some of the more recent extreme-value 
theory approach that may be effective in modeling certain types of operational risk loss 
data. The authors describe an adapted extreme-value method that accounts for non-
stationarity (time dependence) and covariates (different types of losses). However, as of 
today, the model is not fully applicable due to lack of large datasets.  
More specifically, Chavez-Demoulin and Embrechts (2004b) extend the POT 
method by allowing the three parameters of the distribution -namely, the Poisson 
parameter and the Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD) parameters (the shape and the 
scale parameters) to be dependent on time and explanatory variables so as to account for 
the non-stationatity. Following the non-parametric approach in Chavez-Demoulin and 
Embrechts (2004a), they fit different models for the three parameters allowing for 
functional dependence on time and on type of loss data (three types). A discontinuity 
parameter that models the regime switching effect is added as well. Through the model, 
 36
two risk measures, the Value-at-Risk and the Expected-Shortfall29 (ES) both dependent 
on time and covariates are estimated. For illustration purpose, 99%VaR and 99% ES for 
year 2002 are computed.  
The results indicate that the model reasonably estimates the POT parameters. As 
for the risk measures, the authors find out that the risk measures of loss type 3 is 
significantly smaller than those of loss type 1 and 2. This result highlights the importance 
of using all the provided information about the data by including loss types as covariates 
instead of mixing data and getting a unique risk measure. However due to lack of large 
historical data, the authors cannot ensure, through back-testing, that the methodology 
correctly estimates the risk measures. 
The next chapter examines the marked point process methodology sets forth in 
Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005) and Pfeifer and Neslehova (2004) to model the 
dependence structure  across risk categories in terms of aggregate losses. 
2.2.2.2 Loss Severity Modeling 
 
The related literature dealing with estimating operational risk loss severity distribution, 
especially in the tail, comprises different convergent approaches. Each paper offers a 
discussion of various biases that afflict external loss data - most notably the data 
scalability and paucity, the reporting bias - and provides a methodology to circumvent 
these isssues. Significant contributions include Frachot and Roncalli (2002), Baud et al. 
(2002), Frachot et al. (2003), Baud et al. (2003), Fontnouvelle et al. (2003), Fontnouvelle 
et al. (2004), Moscadelli (2004). 
                                                 
29 ES at a specified level α was introduced in both Acerbi et al. (2001) and Rockafellar and Uryasev (2001). 
It is defined by the former authors as “the average loss in the worst 100 α % cases. 
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Frachot et al. (2003) consider that operational risk loss data used to derive 
severity distribution come from diverse sources that include business units within a bank 
and external providers. As a result, prior to assessing loss severity distribution 
calibration, one should reasonably address various issues raised by the mixture of such 
apparently disparate data sources. To that aim, the authors set out two hypotheses 
concerning the nature of data sources and develop arguments in favor of the one that 
could lead to pragmatic and acceptable results, given the current resources devoted to 
operational risk.  
  Hypothesis 1: The diverse sources of data are assumed to be homogeneous in the 
sense that they originate from the same primary probability distribution even though each 
source reports loss data according to its specific threshold. 
Hypothesis 2: The diverse sources of data are presumed to be heterogeneous in 
the sense that they derive from different probability distributions and as such, they need 
to be re-scaled. Furthermore, each source may provide loss data in line with its particular 
threshold.  
As a matter of fact, Frachot et al. (2003) recognize that hypothesis 2 is not only 
the broadest but also the most accurate. But what are the actual cost and benefit tradeoffs 
associated with using alternative modes of accounting for data-pooling issues? Given the 
current state of knowledge of the operational risk community on this topic and given the 
resources dedicated to that class of risk, the authors advocate that hypothesis 2 is 
extremely complicated to be adequately addressed. They argue that the scaling formula 
attempts to derive a mathematical expression that links the internal severity distribution 
to the external one (See Shih et al., 2000). Furthermore, under hypothesis 2, the scaling 
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formula involves large sets of data drawn from various internal and external sources and 
it is not even guaranteed that this scaling adjustment is practicable for all loss event types. 
In the near-future, as soon as loss datasets become larger, further inspection may lead to 
more insights into the issue. Therefore, as of today, it is untimely to think of the 
derivation of consistent scaling functions.  Frachot et al. (2003) also maintain that under 
hypothesis 2, specific scaling formulas need to be estimated to account for differences 
between business lines within a bank. This practice would require a large amount of work 
to be carried out. Finally, the authors cite the empirical work performed by Fontnouelle et 
al. (2003) in which severity distributions are derived from two different external loss 
datasets. The results indicate that both datasets display great similarities once the 
reporting bias has been properly accounted for.  
In the same spirit as Frachot et al. (2003), Baud et al. (2003) mention that the 
discipline of collecting and recording operational risk loss data within financial 
institutions has been set out only lately. As a result, banks do not have access to sufficient 
and adequate data. To mitigate the paucity of data issues, internal loss data must be 
supplemented by external data from public and/or pooled industry databases (Baud et al., 
2002). This practice, however, pose some challenging problems. As pointed out by the 
authors, the data generating processes that underlie the data collection exercise exhibit 
some specific features that challenge the estimation of the loss severity distribution. In 
effect, all loss data are subject to a truncation process by which data are recorded only 
when individual losses exceed some threshold. Baud et al. (2003) argue that mandatory 
thresholds either related to internal loss or set for industry-pooled data cannot always be 
made enforceable within entities that collect data. As for public databases, Baud et al. 
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(2003) point out that they generally comprise of large losses that are released and 
recorded in an informal way without any specific threshold. In light of the 
aforementioned facts, they conclude that for all types of datasets, stated thresholds should 
be regarded as unknown parameters which need to be assessed as well. For industry-
pooled data, the threshold (also referred to as truncation point) should be treated as a 
finite, discrete random variable while, for public datasets, it should be modeled as a 
continuous random variable. In addition, effective thresholds used to report losses, will 
tend to exceed stated thresholds so that industry-pooled and especially public data are 
highly likely to be biased toward extreme losses leading to over-estimated capital 
charges. Reflecting these conclusions, Baud et al. (2003) consider that the discipline of 
using data in the context of operational risk losses should be in a way that the main 
source of data heterogeneity should be accounted for through modeling the threshold 
distribution along with the severity distribution. Furthermore, internal data must be 
employed for estimating the main body of the severity distribution, (expected losses) 
whereas external data should be used to assess the tail of the distribution (unexpected 
losses).  
Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) provide preliminary empirical evidence on how 
publicly available databases could be used to assess operational risk capital charges for 
internationally active banks. Essentially, the authors use the theoretical framework 
suggested by Baud et al. (2002) and extreme value theory to derive both the sample (or 
observed) loss severity and the true (or underlying) loss severity distribution functions for 
publicly available operational risk losses. Assuming that these categories of losses are 
representative of the risks to which internationally active banks are actually exposed to, 
 40
the authors compute various capital charges depending on different levels of control 
environments, sizes and business line's riskiness of banks. The tests performed to validate 
the aforementioned assumption reveal that there is no evidence of any significant time 
trend in the tail of the loss severity distribution and most importantly, there is “no 
statistically significant relationship between the size of a bank and the value of the tail 
thickness” (see also Shih et al., 2000). However, the authors argue that the tail of the 
severity distribution at a specific bank could reflect the quality of its control environment. 
The results from the study indicate that the log-logit-exponential distribution function 
accounts for the reporting bias appropriately and therefore provides a good estimate for 
the sample and the true loss severity distribution function, which in turn substantially 
reduces the required capital charge. The results also reveal that the sample loss severity 
distribution varies by business line. However, the authors cannot conclude whether the 
underlying loss distribution actually varies across business lines. On this account, capital 
charges have been computed as if the underlying loss severity distribution, in the context 
of large operational risk losses, did not vary across business lines.  
Specifically, Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) use data provided by two vendors of 
publicly available operational loss data, OpRisk Analytics and OpVantage. A preliminary 
analysis based on descriptive statistics reveals a difference in terms of data collection 
processes and underlying loss distributions between U.S. losses and non-U.S. losses. In 
addition, more than 66 percent of the reported losses occur in U.S. As a result, the authors 
focus only on U.S. losses in the estimation of the loss severity and the capital charge.  
The true loss severity distribution is derived, based on authors’ assumptions and 
results from EVT: 
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• Assumption 1: The threshold beyond which nominal losses are reported 
can be considered as sufficiently high to apply EVT results. 
• Assumption 2: Operational risk loss distributions belong either to the 
maximum domain of attraction of the Frechet distribution or to that of 
the Gumbel distribution so that conditional excesses loss distributions 
can be approximated by the GPD (Pickands et al. 1974). 
•  The maximum domain of attraction of the Frechet distribution can be 
embedded into that of the Gumbel distribution30. 
• The maximum domain of attraction of the Gumbel distribution is closed 
under logarithm transformations31 . 
From these results, Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) conclude that the conditional excess 
distribution of the logarithm of large operational risk losses can be approximated by the 
GPD distribution with shape parameter equal to 0 (that is, the exponential distribution). 
Both the normal and the logistic distribution functions are investigated to model the 
distribution of the logarithm of the random truncation point. Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) 
argue that capturing an operational loss in public disclosures depends on many random 
factors. These are, among other things, the location of the bank, “personal idiosyncrasies 
of the executives and other individuals involved in the disclosure decisions”. As a result, 
according to the authors, a central limit reasoning suggests that the logarithm of the 
random threshold should be normally distributed. However, this specific distribution 
raises computational issues in terms of non convergence of the maximum likelihood 
optimization function. The logistic distribution, on the other hand, provides a convenient 
                                                 
30  Embrechts et al. (1997) Examples 3.3.33 Page 148 
31  Embrechts et al. (1997) Examples 3.3.34 Page 148 
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framework to estimate the values of the parameters of the sample loss severity 
distribution which turns out to be log-logit-exponential distribution function. Leandri 
(2003) questions the logistic distribution assumed for the random truncation point on the 
grounds that the choice of this specific distribution is not rooted in empirical evidence. 
Because this assumption greatly influences the results, he concludes that further 
investigation is needed to measure the capital charge’s sensitivity to various types of 
distributions.  The author also maintains that there is no clear evidence of fit robustness 
of the logit-exponential function to the loss data since the tail Q-Q plot fit test 
deteriorates toward the tail of the loss distribution. As to the main conclusion of the 
Fontnouvelle et al (2003)’s paper, that is, the true distribution of operational risk large 
losses does not vary across business lines, the author contrasts with two evidences – 
namely, the raw data that differs across business lines and the median of the empirical 
distribution that also differs across business lines. 
In recent study, Fontnouvelle et al. (2004) carry out an empirical exercise 
consisting of modeling operational risk using only internal operational loss data from 
2002 Loss Data Collection Exercise (LDCE)32. Essentially, the study aims at 
understanding modeling issues faced by banks that start collecting operational loss data. 
For the largest losses, results show that severity ranking of event types is similar across 
banks and heavy-tailed distributions reasonably fit the data. In addition, the tail parameter 
estimates for the loss severity distribution are quite similar to the ones based on publicly 
                                                 
32 The 2002 LDCE asked participating banking organizations to report the amount of individual operational 
losses during 2001, internal capital allocation for operational risk, expected operational losses, and a 
number of exposure indicators related to specific business lines. (BCBS, 2003). 
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available losses (Fontnouvelle et al. 2003). The authors investigate whether a full-data33 
approach might work for certain loss event types or business lines. Results indicate that 
for a typical bank, this is not a reasonable way to model operational risk. We now turn to 
the review of the second step of the AMA implementation, that is, the estimation of the 
loss frequency distribution. 
2.2.2.3 Loss Frequency Modeling 
 
Existing literature on operational risk loss frequency modeling includes Cruz (2002), 
Fontnouvelle et al. (2003), Frachot and Roncalli (2002), Fontnouvelle et al. (2004), 
Moscadelli (2004), Chavez-Demoulin at al. (2005) and Neslehova et al. (2006). 
Cruz (2002) indicates that the negative binomial distribution is probably the most 
popular loss frequency distribution in operational risk after the Poisson distribution. It is a 
two-parameter distributions and as such, is more flexible in shape that the Poisson 
distribution. Results from Fontnouvelle et al. (2004) and Moscadelli (2004) show that the 
negative binomial distribution provides a good fit to the frequency of operational risk 
losses.  On the other hand, Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) and notably, Frachot and Roncalli 
(2002) develop a model in which Poisson distribution plays a critical role.  
Frachot and Roncalli (2002) argue that a bank’s internal loss frequency data only 
provide partial information about the bank’s specific riskiness and the effectiveness of its 
risk management practices. As a result, bank’s average historical loss frequencies need to 
be adjusted while assessing capital requirement. The authors use credibility theory to 
handle this specific issue. Typically, they assume that for a bank, the number of loss 
                                                 
33  This methodology involves fitting parametric loss severity (heavy-tail or light-tailed) distributions over 
the entire range of loss amounts.  
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events for a business line/loss event type is Poisson distributed with its parameter equal to 
the unobserved riskiness multiplied by the gross income used as the exposure indicator. 
The unobserved riskiness is assumed to be gamma distributed with two parameters. They 
focus on the random variable represented by the number of loss events conditional to 
historical loss frequencies and compute its expected value as well as its distribution.  
Frachot et al. (2003) point out that the aforementioned method as well as 
approach that uses a square-root pattern to scale external frequencies require large data 
sets that are not currently available. As a result, such computational approaches cannot be 
implemented and the use of internal loss frequencies validated by the bank’s expert 
should be recommended. 
Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) model the frequency of publicly available operational 
losses by using the standard assumptions behind the GPD model which require the 
frequency of large losses to be Poisson distributed. The Poisson parameter is calibrated 
using results of the 2002 LDCE and the fact that a typical internationally active bank 
experiences an average of 50 to 80 losses beyond one million dollar per year, depending 
on its size, control environment and riskiness of its business lines. 
Recently, Chavez-Demoulin et al (2005) advocate the use of point process 
methodology for an advanced loss frequency modeling. They maintain that the issue of 
dependence can be elegantly analyzed through this approach. This will be investigated in 
more details in the chapter 3. We now review the modeling of the capital charge. 
2.3.2.1 Capital Charge Modeling 
In operational risk modeling, the regulatory capital requirement is generally defined in 
three different ways. The first definition considers the capital requirement as the 99.9 
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percentile of the aggregate loss distribution which means that both expected loss (EL) 
and unexpected loss (UL) account for it (BCBS, 2004). The second definition calls for 
unexpected loss only according to BCBS (2004) requirements. Alternatively, Frachot et 
al (2003) determine the capital charge as the 99.9 percentile of the aggregate loss 
distribution where only above-the-threshold individual losses are taken into account. In 
all cases, the focus is on the estimation of the aggregate loss distribution for a given time 
horizon to determine the Value-at-risk at a specific rating target greater or equal to 99.9 
percent. 
Within the standard LDA, the distribution of the aggregate loss is commonly 
estimated either by means of Panjer’s recursion formula or through Monte Carlo 
simulation scheme. The latter approach is based on a two-stage calculation. The first step 
simulates a value of the counting process and the second stage generates several 
severities (depending on the simulated value of the counting process) and aggregates 
them. Capital charge accuracy is sensitive to the number of simulations in the Monte 
Carlo scheme and to the number of grid points in the Panjer algorithm (Frachot et al, 
2001). 
The overall capital charge for the firm is determined by aggregating the capital 
charge as computed above, taking into account correlations or more specifically 
dependence structure across business line/loss event type cells. 
Frachot et al (2003) recognize that the capital charge is driven by two sources of 
randomness and therefore by two sources of correlation – namely, frequency and 
severity. However, the authors argue that within the standard actuarial model “it is 
conceptually difficult to assume simultaneously severity-independence within each class 
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of risk and severity-correlation between two classes”. As a result, they believe that the 
correlation between aggregate losses by event type is essentially driven by the underlying 
correlation between frequencies 
Frachot et al. (2004) carry out an empirical exercise related to the estimation of 
correlation between aggregate losses. They restrict the investigation to the case where 
only frequencies are correlated.  Essentially, the authors compute the formula of the 
covariance between two aggregate losses associated to two classes and find out that the 
aggregate loss correlation is always lower than the frequency correlation. In addition, 
their results indicate that for high severity risk types, aggregate loss correlations may be 
very small even if the frequency is high. On the other hand, for high frequency– low 
severity risk, aggregate loss correlations approximate the frequency correlation. 
However, as evidenced in McNeil et al. (2005) page 205 and emphasized in Chavez-
Demoulin et al. (2005), low correlations do not necessary implied weak dependence. 
2.2.2.4 Confidence Interval  
 
In many views (see Frachot et al. 2003; Embrects et al. 2003), the data paucity that 
characterizes operational risk category has the potential to lead to unstable estimates of 
distribution parameters. Frachot et al (2003) provide a three-stage process to determine 
the capital charge’s empirical distribution as well as its confidence interval. The first 
stage derives the distribution of the underlying estimators of the parameters of the 
counting process and the loss severity. The second step generates from these distributions 
a large set of simulated values. Lastly, for each path, the third step computes the capital 
charge to get its empirical distribution. In the sequel we examine the first and the third 
step in detail. 
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Two different methodologies can be employed to obtain the distribution of the estimators 
of the parameters – namely, the bootstrap method and the Gaussian approximation from 
the maximum likelihood theory. The authors recommend the Gaussian approximation 
due to its relative easiness. Results in this setting indicate that increasing the size of the 
loss data set improves the accuracy of the severity estimates while expanding the number 
of recorded years enhances the precision of the frequency estimate. 
Specifically, Frachot et al (2003) address the accuracy of the capital charge estimate by 
defining and computing a coefficient denoted c, obtained from the following expression. 
?Pr{VaR (1-c) VaR}=α≥ ×  
Where ?VaR denotes the capital charge estimate, VaR its true value and α  the level of 
confidence. The authors contend that such a coefficient is appropriate for supervisory 
purposes since regulators are interested in assessing the risk of under-estimating the 
capital charge. To illustrate the case, they find out that for 1000 losses, the capital charge 
may be undervalued by less than 15 percent for a 95 percent confidence level. The 
authors also use their confidence interval framework to derive the analytical expression 
of the minimum number of observations needed to achieve a specific accuracy for the 
capital charge. 
2.2.2.5 Self-Assessment and Scenario Analysis  
 
Scenario analysis is performed by banks’ experienced managers to adjust the level of 
riskiness conveyed by the bank’s historical loss data. This is particularly the case for 
business lines/loss event types for which historical loss data are infrequent. Frachot et al 
(2003) mention a methodology by which useful information from expert’s scenarios can 
be extracted and plugged into a standard LDA. More specifically, the approach is to 
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embed the scenarios into constraints on the parameters of the counting process and the 
loss severity distribution. As such, the parameters are calibrated by means of a 
constrained maximum likelihood optimization procedure that uses the loss data along 
with the scenario restrictions. 
2.2.2.6 Back-Testing  
 
Back-testing a risk model, as mentioned in Marshall (2001) involves measuring the 
performance of the model by examining any divergence between realized losses and 
historical estimates from the model. There is a compelling need to back-test risk model 
periodically and also following any major event. This helps evaluate the accuracy of the 
model and determine whether some major structural changes have occurred. Cruz (2002) 
presents four tests that provide multiple sources of information on the accuracy of the 
model. These include the clustering of the violations (that reveals whether the model was 
incapable of protection against unexpected losses), the frequency of the violations and the 
size of the violations that necessitates a specification of loss boundaries for the 
acceptance of the model. Also included is the size of the over/under allocation which 
quantifies the difference between the average operational losses and the operational risk 
capital on a daily basis for example. 
Cruz (2002) also indicates that operational risk back-testing consists of two stages 
- the basic analysis and the statistical analysis. The basic analysis aims at reporting a 
summary of the findings to the analyst that checks whether the model fits well. If this test 
is conclusive, then the statistical analysis is performed. Three types of statistical tests are 
mentioned in Cruz (2002). Besides the author’s specific model which is based on 
extremal index and appropriate for operational risk, the two other tests include Kupiec 
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test, and the Crnkovic-Drachman test34. The two latter tests are already in use for market 
risk models.  
According to Cruz (2002), the basic idea in the extremal index test is to check the 
clustering of extreme events and investigate whether the model errors are correlated. The 
Kupiec test (or K test) attempts to verify whether the violation ratio of the model is in 
line with some specific confidence level. Finally, the Crnkovic-Drachman test (or Q test) 
as mentioned in Cruz (2002) focuses on analyzing the difference between the probability 
distribution function of the prediction with the uniform distribution, and thereby assesses 
the fitness of the predictions. 
Contrary to the market VaR models which are validated against the P&L on a 
daily basis, Operational VaR models require to be tested against the losses themselves, 
taking into account the time lag between the event and its effect on the earnings (Cruz , 
2002). 
 
                                                 
34  See Kupiec  (1995) and Crnkovic and Drachman, J. (1996) 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE MODEL 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned earlier, the Committee suggests three approaches to calculating operational 
risk capital charges in a “continuum” of increasing sophistication and risk sensitivity 
(BCBS, 2001c). These are (i) the Basic Indicator Approach; (ii) the Standardized 
Approach and (iii) the Advanced Measurement Approaches. The discussion to follow 
formulates the mathematical expression of each approach, and subsequently investigates 
the implications for modeling the Advanced Measurement Approaches, especially the 
various components of the Loss Distribution Approach. These include the loss severity 
distribution, the loss frequency distribution, the risk dependence structure, and lastly, the 
overall capital charge. Specifically, this chapter presents a promising mathematical 
framework based on point process methodology (see Pfeifer and Neslehova 2004 and 
Chavez-Demoulin et al. 2005), within which aggregate losses are efficiently formulated 
and risk dependence engineered and simulated. This dissertation uses the aforementioned 
framework as well as copulas and finite mixture distribution framework to propose a 
methodology that achieves the estimation of the empirical probability distribution 
function of the capital charge. As to the loss severity probability distribution function, 
publicly available operational loss data set is used for the empirical exercise. An efficient 
symbolic computational framework to estimate the parameters of the loss severity 
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according to the model suggested in Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) is provided. An extension 
of the model to calibrate loss severities of specific firms is proposed as well.  
 
3.2 BCBS Models for the Capital Charge 
 
3.2.1 Basic Indicator Approach  
 
The capital charge BIAK  under this specific approach is expressed as:  
BIAK GIα= ×  
where GI  denotes the average annual gross income over the previous three years and α  
a coefficient set by the Committee to 15 percent. 
 
3.2.2 Standardized Approach  
 
Under the Standardized Approach, the capital charge SAK  is equal to: 
8
1
( ) ( )SA
i
K i GI iβ
=
=∑  
where ( )GI i  stands for the average annual gross income over the previous three years for 
business i and ( ) [12%,18%], 1,2,...,8i iβ ∈ =  set by the Committee 
 
3.2.3  Advanced Measurement Approaches 
 
The Advanced Measurement Approaches encompass three approaches described in the 
following lines. 
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3.2.3.1 Internal Measurement Approach 
 
The capital charge IMAK  is expressed as: 
8 7
1 1
( , ) ( , )IMA
i j
K i j e i jγ
= =
=∑∑  
where for business line/loss event type ( , )i j cell, ( , )e i j  and ( , )i jγ represents the 
expected loss and a scaling factor, respectively. 
3.2.3.2 Scorecard Approach 
 
The capital charge SCAK  is equal to  
8 7
1 1
( , ) ( , ) ( , )SCA
i j
K GI i j i j RS i jω
= =
= × ×∑∑  
where for business line/loss event type ( , )i j cell, ( , )GI i j  denotes the average annual 
income over the previous three years, ( , )i jω  a scaling factor, and ( , )RS i j a risk score. 
3.2.3.3 Loss Distribution Approach 
 
The notation used to describe this approach is in line with  Furrer (2004) page 14. 
One represents the operational loss data set as follows:  
( , ), { 1,..., 1, } (  years),
                {1,2,...,8} (business line),
                {1,2,...,7} (loss event type),
               {1,2,..., ( , )} (number of losses for the period
t
k
t
L i j t T m T T m
i
j
k N i j
∈ − + −
∈
∈
∈ [t,t+1])
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
 
where ( , )tkL i j  denotes an individual loss. 
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For each business line/loss event type ( , )i j cell , let 1( , )TAggL i j+ denote its aggregate loss 
over the period [ , 1]T T + . Then, 
1 ( , )
1 1
1
( , ) ( , )
TN i j
T T
k
k
AggL i j L i j
+
+ +
=
= ∑  
For the sake of simplicity regarding the notation, the following rules are adopted through 
out the text: 
(1) Within a business line/loss event type ( , )i j cell, when there is no need to address 
( , )i j ,  one uses ( )k kL ∈? , 0( )t tN ≥ , 0( )t tAggL ≥    
 (2) To address a specific business line or loss event type ( )i  for a time period equal to 1 
year, we have: 
( )L i , ( ( ))k kL i ∈? , ( )N i , ( )AggL i    
Now, the capital charge ( , )K i j for a cell ( , )i j is expressed as the 99.9 percentile 
of the aggregate loss distribution. 
1
1 1
99.9%( , ) (99.9%) ( )T
T
AggL
K i j F VaR AggL+− += =  
where 11 TAggLF +
−  denotes the quantile function of the aggregate loss function 1( , )TAggL i j+ , 
and VaR stands for the Value at Risk. 
For the whole institution, the Committee first suggests expressing the capital charge as 
follows: 
8 7
1 1
( , )LDA
i j
K K i j
= =
=∑∑  
which is achieved under the assumption of comonotonicity of the vector 
( )(1,1),..., (8,7)K K . As formulated in McNeil et al. (2005) page 199, (1,1),..., (8,7)K K  
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are comonotonic if and only if  ( ) ( )1 56(1,1),..., (8,7) ( ),..., ( )
d
K K v z v z=  for some random 
variable z and increasing functions 1 56,...,v v . 
Coherent risk measures such as Conditional Tail Expectation and Wang 
Transform Measure35 could be used to calculate the capital charges at some specific 
rating target. This consideration is left to future research. The next subsection presents 
the framework and assumptions behind the Loss Distribution Approach. 
 
3.3 Loss Distribution Approach  
 
3.3.1 The Framework  
 
In the sequel, two contexts in which the Loss Distribution Approach could be modeled 
are presented. These include the standard Cramer-Lundberg model and the point process 
methodology envisioned as an extension of the first model. 
3.3.1.1 The Cramer-Lundberg Model 
 
This presentation is close in spirit to Embrechts et al. (1997) page 22. The classical 
Cramer-Lundberg model underlying the Loss Distribution Approach assumes the 
following regarding the four stochastic processes described by the model.  
1- The claim or loss sizes ( )k k NL ∈ are positive iid random variables with finite mean 
and variance. Notice that the terms claim and loss are used interchangeably. 
                                                 
35 See Wang (2002) 
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2- The inter-arrival claim times 1 1 1, , 2,3,...k k kY T Y T T k−= = − = where 1( )n nT ≥  is 
a sequence of random variables such that 1 20 .... a.s.T T< < <  are iid 
exponentially distributed with finite mean 1
1( )E Y λ=  
3- The claim counting defined as the number of claims in the interval [0, ]t  is 
expressed as  sup{ 1: }, 0t nN n T t t= ≥ ≤ ≥   
The counting process ( ) 0t tN ≥  is required to satisfy the following three conditions. 
For all , 0t h≥  
0 0
t
t t h
N
N
N N +
=
∈
≤
?  
4- The total claim amount or the aggregate losses 0( )t tAggL ≥ is modeled by random 
sums and defined as 
1
0 , 0
, 0
t
t
N
t
i t
i
N
AggL
L N
=
⎧ =⎪⎪⎪⎪=⎨⎪ >⎪⎪⎪⎩∑
 
5- In addition, the sequences ( )k k NL ∈  and ( )k k NY ∈ are independent of each other. 
 
As a consequence of this set of assumptions, it follows that: 
 
 (1) The process 0( )t tN ≥ is a homogeneous Poisson process with intensity λ , that is 
( )( ) , 0,1,2...
!
k
t
t
tP N k e k
k
λ λ−= = =   
(2) The processes ( )k k NL ∈  and 0( )t tN ≥ are independent and the process 0( )t tAggL ≥ is a 
compound Poisson process 
Notice that in the case where the inter-arrival claim times are iid with arbitrary 
distribution, the counting process is defined as a renewal process. The expression renewal 
 56
process arises from a special type of random process, where the events represent 
replacement of an item. 
3.3.1.2 The Point Process Methodology  
 
Pfeifer and Neslehova (2004) show that point process methodology is as an appropriate 
approach to modeling dependent loss processes in insurance and finance. The authors 
develop two models that aim at engineering dependent risk in this specific context. This 
subsection defines and summarizes the point process methodology useful to formulate the 
correlation between aggregate losses of operational risk categories. Next, it depicts the 
two above-cited models. 
Definitions 
A point process is a distinct class of stochastic process, for which the time points 
of the occurrence of events are random. Specifically, a point process encompasses a 
counting process as well as an inter-arrival time process. The simplest point process is the 
homogeneous Poisson process while the marked point processes as stated by Rolski et al. 
(1998) page 493 extend standard point processes by incorporating other information 
about the claims like their size or type. Other constructions are superposition and 
clustering of point processes that generate new point processes. Pfeifer and Neslehova 
(2004) page 352 define finite point processes as follows: 
 
Definition 1: (finite point processes) 
Let N  stand for a non-negative integer-valued random variable and ( )i i N∈T  be a family 
of iid random vectors with values in [0, ]d∆ independent of N , for some fixed dimension 
d ∈? . All components of iT  are assumed to be in the interval [0, ]∆ . In this specific 
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case, ∆  is one year. Then the random measure36 
1
:
i
N
i
Iξ
=
=∑ T  is referred to as a (finite) 
point process with counting variable N and multiple event points ( )i i N∈T . In this setting, 
IT stands for the Dirac measure concentrated in the point [0, ]
d∈ ∆T , that is   
1,
( )  for all sets [0, ]
0,
d
T
T A
I A A
T A
⎧ ∈⎪⎪= ⊆ ∆⎨⎪ ∉⎪⎩
 
 
Note that this definition assumes a common counting random variable N for each 
component of the iid random vectors of the family ( )i i NT ∈ . 
Definition 2:  
A point process ξ is called a finite Poisson point process, if the common counting 
variable N is Poisson-distributed. 
The following result in Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005), page 18, is useful for modeling 
and simulating dependent Poisson process triggered by a common effect. 
Let 
1
:
i
N
T
i
Iξ
=
=∑ denote a finite Poisson point process with d-dimensional event points 
( (1),..., ( ))i i iT T d=T . Each of the marginal processes,  
 
( ),
1
( ) 1,..., ,
i
N
T k
i
k I k dξ
=
= =∑  
 
is therefore a one-dimensional Poisson point process with intensity ( ) (.)kE N F where 
(.)kF represents the -thk margin of the joint distribution F of the iT . 
                                                 
36  Simply stated, a measurable function is such that the inverse image of a “nice” set is “nice”. 
  A random measure is a measurable function ξ defined on some probability space taking values almost 
surely on a space with some “nice” properties (see Kallenberg, 1983). Well known examples of random 
measures include the empirical process 1 1 i
n
n Xi
nµ δ− == ∑ where the 'iX s are iid random variables 
and point processes.  
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Conversely, if ( ),
1
( ) 1,..., ,
i
N
T k
i
k I k dξ
=
= =∑ are one-dimensional Poisson processes, then   
1
:
i
N
i
Iξ
=
=∑ T with ( (1),..., ( ))i i iT T d=T  is a d-dimensional Poisson point processes with 
intensity measure (.) ( ) (.)E E N Fξ = where F stands for the joint distribution of iT . 
 
Point process dependence engineering  
 
Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005) page 23 point out that a suitable theory of dependence for 
processes do not really exist. However, if the process is Lévy, the recent concept of Lévy 
copulas37 provides a fruitful approach. Alternatively, Griffiths et al. (1979) define the 
correlation between two one-dimensional point processes (1)ξ  and (2)ξ as the correlation 
coefficient   ( (1)( ), (2)( ))A Bρ ξ ξ  between the random variables (1)( )Aξ and (2)( )Aξ for 
some Borel sets38 ,A B⊂? . Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005) use this specific background 
as well as approaches suggested in Pfeifer and Neslehova (2004) to model dependent 
aggregate losses assuming stationary and independent loss amounts. They retrieve key 
results from Frachot et al. (2004) and Powojowski et al. (2002). The two approaches set 
forth in Pfeifer and Neslehova (2004) include: 
 
Approach 1:  
 
This methodology yields Poisson point processes equipped with a common random 
number N of events. Let 
1
:
i
N
T
i
Iξ
=
=∑  be a Poisson point process with iid -d dimensional 
event-time points ( (1),..., ( ))i i iT T d=T whose joint distributions for each i are given 
                                                 
37  See Tankov (2004), Cont and Tankov (2004), Kallsen and Tankov (2004) 
38 A Borel set is an element of a family of sets with some “nice” properties (sigma-field generated by all 
intervals). 
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through a copula39 function CT . Then the marginal processes 
( ),
1
( ) 1,...,
i
N
T k
i
k I k dξ
=
= =∑ are Poisson, but dependent. For all Borel sets ,A B⊂? , the 
correlation between two processes ( )jξ  and  ( )kξ  is expressed as  
, ( )( ( )( ), ( )( )) , {1,..., }
( ) ( )
j k
j k
F A B
j A k B j k d
F A F A
ρ ξ ξ ×= ∈  
where ,j kF  stands for the joint distribution of  ( )iT j and ( )iT k and jF  and kF  denote the 
marginal distributions of  ( )iT j and ( )iT k , respectively. As pointed out in Pfeifer and 
Neslehova (2004), the marginal processes have a common counting random variable 
N and as a result, only positively correlated Poisson distribution can be achieved through 
this methodology. 
 
Approach 2:  
 
This approach is based on two steps. First, different dependent Poisson random variables 
(1),.., , ( )N N d  governed by a specific copula NC  are generated. Then, the occurrence 
time points ( )iT k  that are possibly dependent, are produced as margins of a 
-d dimensional event-time points ( (1),..., ( ))i i iT T d=T . As a result, d dependent 
processes 
( )
( ),
1
( ) 1,...,
i
N k
T k
i
k I k dξ
=
= =∑ , governed by a copula TC are constructed. 
If the  ( )iT k  are mutually independent, the corresponding correlation can be specified as  
 
( ( )( ), ( )( )) ( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ) , {1,..., }j kj A k B N j N k F A F A j k dρ ξ ξ ρ= ∈  
  
                                                 
39 Typically, a copula function links univariate marginal distributions to their joint distribution. 
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Two facts are worth mentioning here. First, the joint -d dimensional point process is not 
in general a Poisson process. Second, negative correlations are attainable because the sign 
of ( ( ), ( ))N j N kρ  could be negative. 
As it is stated in Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005) page 25, a wide range of models 
can be constructed from these approaches to gain insight into the dependence structure of 
operational risk types. For instance, thinning of specific processes or superposition of 
independent homogenous Poisson point processes with homogeneous positively 
dependent Poisson point process is achievable. 
In the next paragraph, we proceed along the lines of the two abovementioned 
methodologies to present three key findings related to the correlation between aggregate 
losses of operational risk types. 
Dependent Aggregate Losses 
This presentation closely follows Chavez-Demoulin (2005) Page 26. The basic idea is to 
incorporate the loss amounts into the point process modeling. Let 
(1)AggL and (2)AggL denote two aggregate losses related to two operational risk types 
and let [0, ]∆  stands for some period of time. The loss amounts are assumed to be 
stationary and independent. In addition, the loss occurrence times of each risk type 
establish a Poisson point process 
( )
( ),
1
( ) 1, 2
i
N k
T k
i
k I kξ
=
= =∑ . Let (1)iL and (2)iL  represent 
the severities related to (1)iT and (2)iT , respectively. The severities are each iid and 
(1)iL and (2)jL independent of one another for i j≠ . Using the marked point processes 
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framework, it is then possible to describe the entire risk process as point processes as 
indicated by ( )
( )
*
( ), ( ) ,
1
( ) 1, 2
i i
N k
T k L k
i
k I kξ
=
= =∑  
The resulting aggregate losses are specified as follows:  
(1) (2)
1 1
(1) (1)  and   (2) (2)    
N N
k k
k k
AggL L AggL L
= =
= =∑ ∑  
The correlation between (1)AggL and (2)AggL is now expressed in terms of various types 
of dependence between the underlying loss occurrences processes (1)ξ and (2)ξ . 
Case1: Modeling (1)ξ and (2)ξ  according to Approach 1 gives rise to the correlation 
coefficient suggested in Pfeifer and Neslehova (2004). 
( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1
2 2
1 1
(1) (2)
(1), (2)
(1) (2)
E L L
AggL AggL
E L E L
ρ =  
provided that ( )21(1)E L <∞ and ( )21(2)E L <∞  
 
Case 2: In case (1)iL and (2)iL are independent for any i , Approach 2 yields:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1
2 2
1 1
(1) (2)
(1), (2) ( (1), (2))
(1) (2)
E L E L
AggL AggL N N
E L E L
ρ ρ=  
 
as described in Frachot et al. (2004). 
 
A simple example of superposition (common Poisson shock) is constructed when the 
processes (1)ξ and (2)ξ are set as the sum of independent homogeneous Poisson point 
processes kξ with intensities , 1, 2,3k kλ = , that is 1 3(1)ξ ξ ξ= +  and 2 3(2)ξ ξ ξ= + . 
It follows that  
( )( )
3
1 3 2 3
( (1), (2))N N λρ λ λ λ λ= + +  
and therefore  
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( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 13
2 2
1 3 2 3 1 1
(1) (2)
(1), (2)
(1) (2)
E L E L
AggL AggL
E L E L
λρ λ λ λ λ
⎛ ⎞⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟+ + ⎟⎜⎝ ⎠
 
This example appears in Powojowski et al. (2002). The subsection devoted to the loss 
frequency distribution discusses it in more details. The next subsection considers the 
calibration of the loss severity distribution using the assumptions mention earlier, that is, 
loss severities are stationary and independent. 
3.3.2 Loss Severity Distribution Models 
3.3.2.1 Publicly Available Operational Loss Modeling  
 
This subsection focuses on the calibration of the loss severity distribution, using publicly 
available operational loss data set. As noted earlier, this specific data set is plagued by 
many biases that impede one’s ability to uncover the true underlying loss severity 
distribution. The following lines build on Fontnouvelle et al (2003) and suggest a 
symbolic computational approach that makes such a calibration easier.  
Frachot et al. (2003) and Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) assume that contributors’ 
operational loss data are sampled from the same probability distribution40, and as such are 
not different from each other. However, losses are captured according to some 
unobserved random truncation point that needs to be accounted for. One way to proceed 
is to jointly estimate the parameters of the loss distribution as well as those of the random 
truncation point. The random truncation point modeling is described as follows. 
Let us consider two independent random variables  and  X H  and let 
| ( | )X Hf x h x<  denote the probability density function of the observed values of X  (that 
is, X is observed when it exceeds the unobserved truncation point H ). 
                                                 
40  See also Okunev (2005). 
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 | ( | )X Hf x h x<  is expressed as41: 
|
( ) ( )( | )
( ) ( )
X H
X H
X H
f x F xf x h x
f t F t dt
< =
∫
?
 
where ( ) and  ( )HXf x F x  represent the probability density function and the cumulative 
distribution function of  and  X H , respectively. Random truncation modeling is 
generally used in economics, reliability, and astronomy. In this latter field, it is known as 
the Malmquist bias in the study of galaxies. 
Now let L denote the random variable representing the operational loss amount, 
u  the nominal threshold ($1 million) and log( ) log( ) |X L u L u= − >  the conditional 
excess loss. Notice that log( ) | 1X L L= >  since 1u = . If one assumes that the distribution 
of operational losses of a specific business line/event type cell belong to the maximum 
domain of attraction of either the Frechet distribution or the Gumbel distribution and if 
one considers u  as a sufficient high threshold, results from EVT (Embrechts et al, 1997 
page 148), indicate that the distribution function of X  may be approximated by 
0, ( ) 1 exp
xG xβ β
⎛ ⎞= − −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  which is the exponential distribution with density  
0,
1( ) exp xg xβ β β
⎛ ⎞= −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ . 
As to the random truncation point *H , in addition to the known and constant case, this 
study assumes two other distributions for *log( )H H= , namely the logistic distribution as 
                                                 
41  See Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) for the proof. 
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in Fontnouvelle (2003) and the normal distribution42. A fourth case, worth mentioning is 
that of the alpha stable non Gaussian exponentially truncated distributions. This class of 
distributions is gaining importance in empirical finance in that it provides better fit of the 
tails of distribution than normal distributions. As pointed out by Nolan (2001), these 
distributions are now more computationally tractable and should be part of quantitative 
risk managers’ toolkit.  This will be examined in future work. 
Let ( , )X H denote the random vector representing the conditional excess log 
losses and the log random truncation point, let ( )H X<  denote the event that 
characterizes publicly available operational risk loss data. For the random truncation 
point distribution, let  and  σ µ  denote the scale and location parameters respectively.  
For the normal distribution, 
21 1( ) exp
22
h
H
t hF h dtµ µσ σπσ −∞
⎛ ⎞− −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − = Φ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠∫  
where Φ  denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
For the logistic distribution,  
1( )
1 exp
HF h h µ
σ
= −⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
The expression of the loss severity pdf is then described as follows: 
                                                 
42 See Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) page 12 for a discussion on factors that impact public disclosures of 
operational losses. 
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|
exp
,  for the normal case
exp
exp
( | )
1 exp
,  for the logistic case
exp
1 exp
x
x
u
X H
u
x x
t t dt
x
f x h x
x
t
dt
t
µ
β σ
µ
β σ
β
µ
σ
β
µ
σ
+∞
+∞
⎧ ⎛ ⎞ −⎛ ⎞− Φ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎪⎪ ⎛ ⎞ −⎛ ⎞− Φ⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎪⎪ ⎛ ⎞⎪ −⎜ ⎟⎪< = ⎝ ⎠⎨⎪ −⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎛ ⎞⎪ −⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎪ −⎛ ⎞⎪ + −⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎩
∫
∫
 
where xu  denotes a value related to the date of occurrence of the loss. Its expression is 
determined in the sequel.   
 Since the calibration of the loss severity pdf is performed at the end of 2003, one 
needs to express all individual loss amounts in real terms, using various levels of the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI). This removes the effect of inflation and allows better 
comparison of the individual loss amount across years. The lower bound of the domain of 
integration xu  is adjusted accordingly. So, in real terms, a loss with nominal value 0L u≥  
that occurs in year 2003k ≤ , amounts to 20030
k
CPIL L
CPI
= ×  in 2003, where kCPI denotes 
the year k  Consumer Price Index. As a result, the lower bound of the set containing all 
conditional excess losses 20030log log( )
k
CPIx L u
CPI
⎛ ⎞= × −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (from losses 0L u≥  that occur 
in year 2003k ≤ )  is expressed as  
2003
2003
log log( )
    log
lb
k
k
k
CPIx u u
CPI
CPI
CPI
⎛ ⎞= × −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
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Thus,  
|
exp
,  for the norm al case
exp
exp
( | )
1 exp
,  for the logistic case
exp
1 exp
X H
lbxk
lbxk
x x
t t dt
x
f x h x
x
t
dt
t
µ
β σ
µ
β σ
β
µ
σ
β
µ
σ
⎧ ⎛ ⎞ −⎛ ⎞− Φ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎪⎪ ⎛ ⎞ −⎛ ⎞− Φ⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎪⎪ ⎛ ⎞⎪ −⎪ ⎜ ⎟< = ⎨ ⎝ ⎠⎪ −⎛ ⎞+ −⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎪⎪ ⎛ ⎞−⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎪ −⎪ ⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎩
∫
∫
 
 
This means that the support of the probability density function | ( | )X Hf x h x<  describing 
the observed losses is the interval 2003log ,
k
CPI
CPI
⎡ ⎞⎛ ⎞ +∞⎟⎢ ⎜ ⎟ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎠
 
The location parameterµ  represents the magnitude of loss that has a 50 percent 
chance of being captured, while the scale parameter σ  reflects the rate at which the 
reporting probability changes as the loss size varies (Fontnouvelle et al., 2003) 
3.3.2.2 Symbolic Computational Model 
 
The following subsection describes a symbolic computational approach to estimating the 
parameters ( , , )β µ σΘ =  of the observed loss severity distribution. Specifically, for this 
illustration, the log of the random truncation point is assumed to be logistically 
distributed. 
Suppose that one is interested in estimating the parameters of the severity for a 
specific business unit/event type cell. The publicly available operational risk data loss 
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consists of n losses beyond $1 million over m  years, that is { } { }{ }1 1, ,..., ,nk k nT L T L  where 
ik
T denotes the year of occurrence of loss iL  with 1 i n≤ ≤  and 1 ik m≤ ≤ . Since the 
study period ranges from 1960 to 2003 {1960,..., 2003}
ik
T ∈ and 2003 1960 1m= − +  
34=  years.  
{ } { }{ }1 1, ,..., ,nk k nT L T L  is then transformed into { } { }{ }11, ,..., , nlb lbk n kx x x x  where 
log
i
i
lb m
k
k
CPIx
CPI
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
(
ik
CPI  for year 
ik
T ) and ix  the conditional excess loss ( 
log( ) log( ) |i i ix L u L u= − > )  
The maximum likelihood function based on the set of data 
{ } { }{ }11, ,..., , nlb lbk n kx x x x is given by  
1
( | ) ( | , )( | )
( | ) ( | , )
lb
ki
n
X i H i
i
X H
x
f x F xL X
f t F t dt
β µ σ
β µ σ
∞
=
×Θ =
×
∏
∫
 
Replacing ( | )X if x β  and ( | , )H iF x µ σ  by their respective expressions, one gets: 
1
exp
1 exp
( | )
exp
1 exp
i
i
i
n
i
lbxk
x
x
L X
t
dt
t
β
µ
σ
β
µ
σ
=
∞
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
−⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠Θ = ⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
−⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∏
∫
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It turns out that this maximum likelihood function is computationally intensive43 
because of the convolution of distributions functions appearing in the denominator. To 
easy this calculation, a symbolic-numeric approach is adopted.  
Since  
1
log ,..., log
i
lb m m
k
m
CPI CPIx
CPI CPI
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪∈⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
 
and 1 ... mCPI CPI≤ ≤  do not depend on the conditional excess loss amount ix  it is 
feasible to symbolically compute the vector of integrals ( )1 ,..., mk kI I beforehand. 
exp
1 exp
i
i
k
lbxk
t
I dt
t
β
µ
σ
∞
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= −⎛ ⎞+ −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫  
Now, one can express the maximum likelihood function as  
1
exp
( | )
1 exp
i
n
i i
i
x
L X
xy
β
µ
σ
=
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠Θ = ⎛ − ⎞⎛ ⎞× + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∏  
where 
ii k
y I= for some ik . 
The computational process is now based on the set of data { } { }{ }1 1, ,..., ,n nx y x y . 
 Specifically, the code of the above algorithm can be implemented in Mathematica 
as follows: 
Step 1 
Define a vector containing log
i
i
lb m
k
k
CPIx
CPI
⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 as cpiVector  
                                                 
43  See Baud et al, 2002, Fontnouvelle et al, 2003, Frachot et al 2003 
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Step 2 
Compute the vector of integrals symbolically  
{ }
cpiVector[[i]]
exp
integralVector=Table[ , i,1,Length[cpi]
1 exp
t
dt
t
β
µ
σ
∞
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
−⎡ ⎤+ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫  
This vector is computed once and saved on disk for future use. For example, the 
expression of 
1k
I , the first component of integralVector, is expressed in 
Mathematica numerics  as follows: 
1
−1+ βσ
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jjjjjjjjj
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Step 3 
Define the probability density function as  
exp
1 exp
x
f
xy
β
µ
σ
⎛ ⎞−⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= ⎛ − ⎞⎛ ⎞× + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
 
Step 4 
Express the maximum likelihood function as  
{ }( )n
i=1
LogL=Log / . ,i if x x y y
⎡ ⎤→ →⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∏  
Step 5 
Compute the observed log-likelihood from a matrix dataMat, containing the 
individual losses with their ages. 
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{ } _
_
sampleLik=LogL/. n->Length[dataMatrix] , : dataMat[[i,1]]
: integralVector[dataMat[[i,2]]]}
i
i
x
y
→
→  
Step 6 
Maximize the objective function sampleLik with an optimization program to get 
the estimates of the targeted parameters , , and β µ σ . These values are relevant to 
large internationally active banks. 
The aforementioned approach is easy to implement, significantly reduces the 
computing time and as a result, facilitates the calibration of the loss severity which is a 
major issue in operational risk capital modeling.  For a specific organization, additional 
constraints on the targeted parameters ,β µ σ  imposed through a risk assessment 
framework could be easily plugged into this maximum likelihood paradigm to get the 
estimates of the parameters. Setting these constraints is examined in the sequel. 
3.3.2.3 Calibration for Specific Organizations 
 
The parameters of the loss severity as well as those of the random truncation point were 
jointly estimated assuming that all losses from the data set were incurred by a typical 
large internationally active bank (Fontnouvelle et al, 2003 page 3). In the rest of this 
dissertation such a large internationally active bank will be simply referred to as an 
“industry-wide organization”. Furthermore, it is possible to envision different categories 
of industry-wide organizations, each with a specific yearly loss frequency distribution. 
This section of the dissertation investigates the extent to which Fitch data set could be 
used to calibrate the severity of a specific bank.  In other words, if all these losses, drawn 
from the same probability distribution, were incurred by a specific firm, how could one 
account for the positive correlation that exists between the loss amount and the 
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probability of its disclosure44? This is an important question left for future research in 
Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) page 22. 
The following subsection proposes an approach that uses the concept of Probable 
Maximum Loss (PML) to account for firm size, rating, quality of internal control 
environment, and market-related factors to estimate the parameters of the distribution of 
the random truncation point independently of the maximum likelihood framework 
described previously.   
The concept of Probable Maximum Loss stems from fire insurance where it has 
been noticed that total losses were very infrequent in categories where there are public 
fire protection and fire-resistive structures. Bennett (1992) defines the PML as “the 
largest possible loss that may occur, in regard to a particular risk, given the worst 
combination of circumstances”. Wilkinson (1992) and Kremer (1990, 1994) suggest 
expressing the PML as either (1 ) [ ]nE Mθ− or [ ]E M VarMn nθ+ where 
m ax( , ..., )1M L Ln n=  is the maximum of n claims and θ a safety loading coefficient. 
Cebrian et al (2004) obtain the PML by solving the following equation 
[ ] 1 ,P M PM Ln εε≤ = −  
for some 0ε > . In other words, the PML can be considered as a high quantile of the 
maximum of a random sample of size n , that is  
1PM L (1 )FM n
εε −= − . 
 This latter formula can be estimated using two different methodologies. 
Wilkinson (1992) advocates the use of order statistics, while Kremer (1990, 1994) and 
                                                 
44  See Fontnouvelle et al (2003). The probability of disclosure is also referred to as the reporting 
probability. 
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Cebrian et al (2004) suggest a methodology rooted in extreme value theory. Now, we are 
in a position to describe the proposed model. 
It is assumed that for a specific organization, each business line/event type cell 
has an explicit random truncation point that is logistically distributed. It is further 
assumed that through an appropriate risk assessment exercise or a computational 
paradigm as the one described earlier, a PML is assigned to each business line/event type 
cell, and this PML reflects the size, the rating, the quality of internal control of the firm as 
well as market-related factors. Thus, to derive the scale and location parameters of the 
probability distribution function of the truncation point, it suffices to match percentiles at 
two different losses.  
For a specific firm, let us consider a business line/event type cell endowed with its 
PML. For this cell, let Fs  denote the probability distribution function of the log random 
truncation point log[ ]Hs  of this specific organization. Similarly, let Fi  stand for the 
probability distribution function of the log random truncation point [ ]Log Hi  of an 
industry-wide organization. It is worth noting that the parameters of Fi  are jointly 
estimated with that of the loss severity pdf using the industry-wide operational losses.  
Now, let (log( ))F PMLs denote the probability of the event { }H PLMs ≤  that 
characterizes the disclosure of the specific organization’ PML (the reporting probability 
of the PML). Likewise, let (log( ))F PMLi stand for the probability of disclosure of the 
industry-wide organization’ PML. In passing, note that 
[ ]log( ) log( )(log( )) Pr sH PMLF PMLs ≤=   [ ]Pr sH PML= ≤ .  
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 If a risk assessment exercise sets the value of (log( ))F PMLs  to a specific level, 
(depending on the firm’s size, rating, internal control environment, and market-related 
factors), and if, for example, it is further assumed that the median of the two distributions 
matches, then one is in a position to derive the parameters of the distribution of the 
random truncation point of the specific firm and, thereby, estimate the underlying loss 
severity parameter using the maximum likelihood estimation approach. The key finding 
is that if (log( )) (log( ))F PML F PMLs i≥ , then the underlying loss severity parameter of 
the specific firm is lower than that of the industry-wide organization which means that 
the specific organization could experience less severe operational losses than the 
industry-wide organization. The converse holds true if (log( )) (log( ))F PML F PMLs i≤ . 
It is worth noticing that this model still assumes that all losses of the data set 
could be experienced by the specific firm. However, the random truncation function that 
accounts for firm size, rating, internal control environment as well as market-related 
factors provides a system of weights that impact the observed losses and thereby the 
underling loss severity distribution.  
The next paragraph examines different ways to assess the loss frequency 
distribution. 
 
3.3.3 Loss Frequency Distribution. 
 
In the standard POT model, it is well known that the number of exceedances of a high 
threshold follows a Poisson process45. This result underpins the loss frequency 
                                                 
45  See Embrecht et al. (1997) page 366. 
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distribution modeling in this study. To calibrate the distribution, one uses the fact that 
large international active banks incur an average of 50 to 80 losses above $1 million each 
year, depending on their sizes, control environments and riskiness of their business lines 
(Fontnouvelle et al. 2003). As to small-size organizations, expert judgment is also used to 
extract the loss frequency distribution function parameters. Besides this base model, this 
study presents a simple common Poisson shock framework suggested by Powojowski et 
al. (2002) and mentioned in Chavez-Demoulin et al. (2005). Impact of this model on the 
capital charge is investigated. Details of the suggested methodology are described as 
follows: 
The intent of the approach described in Powojowski et al. (2002) is to account for 
the correlation of loss frequency across operational loss risk class or unit by means of an 
underlying common shock methodology. More specifically, the model is based on the 
idea that a set of m  independent underlying loss processes, each characterized by a one-
dimensional Poisson process, (that is 
* ( )
*
( )
1
( )
q
N i
T i
q
i Iξ
=
=∑ , where the counting variable 
*( )N i is Poisson-distributed with intensity ( ) 1,...,i i mλ = ) can be constructed to 
generate the dependence structure of n  observed operational  loss processes, each 
characterized by one-dimensional point process
( )
( ),
1
( ) 1,...,
q
N j
T j
q
j I j nξ
=
= =∑ . Each of 
these underlying loss processes can be ascribed to one or more of the observed 
operational loss processes. It turns out that the counting variable ( )N j  of the observed 
loss process can be expressed as: 
*
1
( ) ( , ) ( )
m
i
N j i j N iδ
=
=∑  
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where ( , )i jδ  denotes the indicator variable. 
( )N j  is therefore Poisson-distributed with intensity  
1
( ) ( , ) ( )
m
i
j i j iτ δ λ
=
=∑  
Intuitively, this model presupposes the existence of common shocks which affect more 
than one operational risk class.  The covariance and correlation coefficients between 
( ) and ( )N j N k are as follows: 
1
( ( ), ( )) ( , ) ( )
m
ik
i
Cov N j N k i j iδ λ δ
=
=∑  
1
1 1
( , ) ( ) ( , )
( , )
( , ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
m
i
m m
i i
i j i i k
j k
i k i i k i
δ λ δ
ρ
δ λ δ λ
=
= =
=
×
∑
∑ ∑
 
Under this model, only positive correlation is permissible. A simple case that assumes a 
single enterprise-wide source of loss is such that 1m n= +   and * *( ) ( ) ( )N j N j N m= + , 
( ) ( ) ( )j j mτ λ λ= +  for 1,...j n=  
Thus,  
( ( ), ( )) ( )Cov N j N k mλ=  
( ) ( )
( )( , )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
mj k
j m k m
λρ λ λ λ λ= + × +  
for , 1,... andj k n j k= ≠  
This case is investigated through the empirical exercise conducted in this dissertation. 
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3.3.4 Modeling Dependence Structure  
 
As a tool to model joint effects of multiple risks, the concept of copula has recently 
attracted extensive attention from the financial community as it conveys more meaningful 
information about dependence structure than the conventional Pearson correlation. A 
typical example is the key concept of tail dependence that will be examined in the sequel.  
This subject is relevant to operational risk practitioners since within the BCBS 
framework, banks are required to calculate the capital charge for each of the 56 business 
line/event type cells and use a dependence structure model to aggregate these values. As 
pointed out in Frachot et al. (2003), the dependence structure envisioned by the 
Committee is that of aggregate losses since it is this latter dependence structure which is 
considered when it comes to aggregating capital charges. 
Simply stated, a copula function links univariate marginal distributions to their 
joint distribution. A theorem due to Sklar (1959) states that if 1( ,..., )dX X X=    is a 
random variable with joint distribution function F , then there exists a copula function 
C such that  
 1 1 1( ,..., ) ( ( ),..., ( ))d n dF x x C F x F x=  
where iF is the ith marginal distribution function, for 1, 2,...,i d= . 
Conversely, any given copula C  can be used to link any collection of univariate marginal    
distribution functions 1,..., dF F  to create a joint distribution function F  that satisfies the 
aforementioned relation. It should be noted that the latter statement constitutes the 
rationale for the methodology I implement to derive the aggregated capital charges using 
various families of copulas. This statement also underpins the concept of meta 
distributions as described in McNeil et al. (2005) page 192. Notice also that most of the 
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results related to copulas are stated under the assumption of absolute continuity of the 
univariate marginals. Indeed, under this requirement, there is a unique copula C  such 
that for 1( ,..., ) [0,1]
d
du u u= ∈  
 1 11 1 1( ,..., ) ( ( ),..., ( ))d d dC u u F F u F u
− −=  
where  
 { }1( ) inf : ( ) , 1,...,i i i iF u x F x u i d− = > =     
are the marginal quantile functions. 
 
When the marginals are not continuous as it is in the case of discrete distributions, 
the underlying copula is not unique. Typically, the copula framework becomes more 
complicated to tackle and the determination of the dependence structure may involve the 
marginals (Neslehova, 2004).  
Recent developments on copulas can be found in Marshall (1996) for the discrete 
case, Joe (1997), Embrechts et al (1999), Nelsen (1999), Neslehova (2004), and McNeil 
(2005). Following is a brief presentation of some useful families of copulas that are 
considered in this study. 
Tang et al. (2004) describe three classes of copulas that are generally used in 
finance and insurance. These are the copulas of extreme dependence, the Archimedean 
copulas and the elliptical copulas. The copulas of extreme dependence include the 
independence copula, the Frechet lower bound for copulas and the Frechet upper bound 
for copulas. The independence copula or product copula ( )uΠ  is expressed as:  
 1( ) ... du u uΠ = . 
while, the Frechet bounds for copulas are  
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 1( ) min( ,..., )dM u u u=  
and  
 1( ) ( ... 1,0)dW u max u u d= + + − +  
 
with  
 ( ) ( ) ( )W u C u M u≤ ≤  
Note that for 2,d ≥  ( )M u defines a copula, called the comonotonic copula that 
describes a perfect positive dependence structure, while for 2d > , ( )W u  is no longer a 
copula. Archimedean copulas or explicit copulas constitute the second class of copulas. 
They are based on one generator function, and as such, have simple closed forms (Aas, 
2004). This class of copulas allows for asymmetry, and as a result, exhibits greater 
dependence in the negative tail or in the positive tail. However these copulas generally 
fail to account for multivariate dependence structure as they have one single parameter to 
describe the dependence. Examples of Archimedean copulas include the Clayton copula 
and the Gumbel copula. Elliptical copulas or implicit copulas comprise the third class of 
copulas. Typically, elliptical copulas are copulas implied by elliptical distributions. Well-
known examples of elliptical distributions include multivariate normal, t-student, and 
logistic distributions. Elliptical copulas allow for joint extreme events, but fail to account 
for asymmetries. In addition, they do not have a simple close form. Regardless of these 
shortcomings, they are becoming more and more popular for empirical exercises as they 
are remarkably easy to simulate. Tang et al (2004) also acknowledge the flexibility of this 
family of copulas to account for differences in pair-wise dependence structure by using a 
variance-covariance framework. 
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The expressions of the aforementioned copulas are as follows: 
For the normal copula: 
 ( )1 11( ) ( ),..., ( )dR dC u u u− −= Φ Φ Φ  
where dRΦ denotes the joint distribution function of the d-dimensional multivariate 
standard normal distribution function with linear correlation matrix R . 
In the bivariate case, the copula expression is:  
1 1
1 2( ) ( ) 2 2
1 2 2 2
1 2( , ) exp
2 (1 ) 2(1 )
u u s st yC u u dsdtρ
ρ
π ρ ρ
− −Φ Φ
−∞ −∞
⎧ ⎫− += −⎨ ⎬− −⎩ ⎭∫ ∫  
where ρ denotes the parameter of the copula. 
 
The expression of the Student’s t-copula is  
    ( )1 1, 1( ) ( ),..., ( )d R dC u t t u t uν ν ν− −=  
where ,
d
Rtν  denotes the joint distribution function of the d-dimensional multivariate 
Student’s t-distribution function with linear correlation matrix R  and ν  degrees of 
freedom. 
In the bivariate case, the copula expression is:  
1 1
1 2
( 2) / 2( ) ( ) 2 2
, 1 2 2 1/ 2 2
1 2( , ) 1
2 (1 ) (1 )
t u t u s st yC u u dsdt
ν ν ν
ρ ν
ρ
π ρ ν ρ
− − − +
−∞ −∞
⎧ ⎫− += +⎨ ⎬− −⎩ ⎭∫ ∫  
where ρ denotes the parameter of the copula. 
The Clayton copula in the bivariate case has the following expression: 
 
 1/1 2 1 2( , ) ( 1)C u u u u
δ δ δ
δ
− − −= + −  
where 0 δ< < ∞  denotes a parameter controlling the degree of dependence. 
 
The Gumbel copula in the bivariate case can be expressed as: 
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( )1/1 2 1 2( , ) exp (( log ) ( log ) )C u u u uδ δ δδ = − − + −  
 
 
where 1 δ≤ < ∞  denotes a parameter controlling the degree of dependence. 
 
This study presents the capital charges in the context of comonotonic, 
independence, and elliptical copulas. For elliptical copulas, we make use of the converse 
statement in Sklar’s theorem that gives rise to various meta distributions (meta- Gaussian 
distribution, meta- tν distribution, see McNeil et al. (2005)). The case of Archimedean 
copulas will be investigated in future work.  
The following is a summary of the algorithm that simulates a vector of dependent 
aggregate losses ( (1),..., ( ))AggL AggL d  with marginal (1) (1),...,AggL AggLF F  and the 
associated elliptical copula C . 
For the normal copula, the ith simulated aggregate loss is  
( )( )1 1 1( ) 1( ) ( ( ),..., ( )AggL i i dAggL i F A u u− − −= Φ Φ Φ  
where ( )uΦ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution, A  the lower triangular 
matrix obtained from the Choleski decomposition of the linear correlation matrix of  the 
specified copula, and iu  for 1 i d≤ ≤ , are d independent standard uniform variables. 
Notice that the normal copula transformation gives rise to the simulation of the 
transform of the aggregate losses ( )AggL i , that is *( )AggL i , under the Wang Transform. 
Indeed, by setting  
1 1 1
1( ( ),..., ( )) ( )i d iA u u u λ− − −Φ Φ = Φ +  
where 1( )λ α−= Φ , with α  denoting the specified rating target or confidence level. 
one gets  
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( )( )* 1 1( )( ) ( )AggL i iAggL i F u λ− −= Φ Φ +  
As to the Student’s t-copula, the ith simulated aggregate loss is  
( )1 1 1( ) 1( ) ( ( ),..., ( )AggL i i dAggL i F t A u uSν ν− − −⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞= Φ Φ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠  
where tν is the Student’s t cumulative distribution function with ν  degrees of freedom, A  
the lower triangular matrix obtained from the Choleski decomposition of the linear 
correlation matrix of  the specified copula, S  a random number generated from the chi-
square distribution random variable 2 ( )χ ν independent from each of the standard normal 
variables 1( )iu
−Φ . 
We have previously mentioned that elliptical copulas allow for joint extreme 
events. To clarify this statement, we need to elaborate on the concept of upper tail 
dependence.  
Let ~  and  ~X YX F Y F  denote a pair of random variables. By definition
46, the 
upper tail dependence coefficient is formulated as  
 1 1
1
lim ( ( ) | ( ))u Y XP Y F X Fαλ α α−
− −
→
= > >  
This expression measures the probability of observing a large ,Y  assuming that X is 
large. The interpretation of this coefficient is that if 0,uλ >  extreme events tend to occur 
concurrently while in the case where 0,uλ = there is no tail dependence and the random 
variables  and X Y  are said to be asymptotically independent.  
As to the normal copula characterized by its parameterρ , the coefficient of the 
upper tail dependence is expressed as  
                                                 
46  See McNeil et al. (2005). 
 82
12 lim 0
1u x
x ρλ ρ→−∞
⎛ ⎞− ⎟⎜ ⎟= Φ =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ +⎝ ⎠  
For the Student’s t-copula characterized with its parameters ν andρ , it comes that  
1
( 1)(1 )2
1u
tν
ν ρλ ρ+
⎛ ⎞+ − ⎟⎜ ⎟= −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ +⎝ ⎠  
where 1tν+  denotes the distribution function of the univariate Student’s t-distribution with 
1ν+ degrees of freedom ρ  the Pearson correlation coefficient between  and X Y . The 
aforementioned formula expresses the idea that lower degrees of freedom give rise to 
heavy tail dependence for the Student’s t-copula. As a result, the copula theory predicts 
that the lower the degrees of freedom, the higher the capital charges since the 
simultaneous occurrence of extreme events will adversely impact the resulting aggregate 
loss distribution from which the capital charge is derived. Figure 6.1 plots upper tail 
values in function of the correlation coefficient for 3 degrees of freedom. 
For the empirical exercise, this study uses the empirical rank correlations from 
which linear correlations are derived and adjusted by expert judgment47. In addition, the 
approach developed in Powojowski et al. (2002) is investigated whenever all second 
moments of loss severities are finite. Specifically, as shown previously, for two aggregate 
losses, we have   
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1
2 2
1 1
( ) ( )
( ), ( ) ( ( ), ( ))
( ) ( )
E L i E L j
AggL i AggL j N i N j
E L j E L j
ρ ρ=  
with ( )( )( ( ), ( ))
m
i m j m
N i N j λρ
λ λ λ λ
=
+ +
 
                                                 
47  See Tang et al. (2004) for similar adjustment.  
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provided that ( )21( )E L i <∞  and ( )21( )E L j <∞ . This holds whenever all underlying 
loss severity distributions (which are log-exponential or Pareto type I ) have parameters 
β strictly less than 0.5.  
3.3.5 Capital Charge Modeling 
 
This subsection proposes an approach towards deriving the overall capital charge, taking 
into account a whole set of dependence structures.  As a matter of fact, one may 
ultimately select the copula that minimizes the distance to the empirical copula of the 
data (Romano et al., 2002; Deheuvels, 1979) or extract the matrix of rank correlations 
(Kendall’s tau) as well as the degrees of freedom from the data set (see Mashal and 
Zeevi, 2002). However, in the context of publicly available operational losses, it is 
argued that for each business line/loss event type cell, an accurate estimation of the rank 
correlation matrix, the degrees of freedom as well as of the empirical copulas cannot be 
obtained due to the lack of sufficient data and the presence of reporting biases in the data 
set. Therefore, one way to settle this issue is to account for a family of copulas to get the 
empirical distribution of the overall capital charge. In this study, a set of 13 dependences 
structures is explored. These include the comonotonic dependence, the Student’s t-copula 
with the degrees of freedom ranging from 1 to 10, the normal copula and the 
independence copula. 
 The copula theory, through the upper tail dependence properties predicts that 
1 10
....com t t normal indepCap Cap Cap Cap Cap≥ ≥ ≥ ≥  where comCap  and 
 for 1,...,10
it
Cap i=  denote the capital charge under the comonotonic dependence and 
the student’s t copula, respectively. These will be examined in the empirical exercise. 
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Now, we are in a position to describe the approach to estimating the overall capital 
charge. 
The framework is that of the finite mixture distribution, especially the component-
mix distribution in which the overall capital charge is expressed as a mixing weighted 
capital charges. Recent literature dealing with distributions formed from component-
mixes can be found in Rose et al. (2002) and Titterington et al. (1985). 
Specifically, component mix distributions are generated from linear combinations 
of distributions. Following Rose et al (2002), in the case of a discrete random variable 
iX , let ( ) ( )i if x P X x= =  for 1,..., ,i n= denote the probability mass function and let 
iπ denote a parameter such that 0 1iπ≤ ≤  and 
1
1
n
i
i
π
=
=∑ .  Then, the n-component-mix 
random variable is defined as  
 1 1~ ... n nX X Xπ π+ +  
and its probability mass function is expressed as  
 
1
( ) ( )
n
i i
i
f x f xπ
=
=∑  
The parameters  iπ  for 1,..., ,i n=  are defined as the mixing weights and the 
functions if  for 1,..., ,i n=  are called the component densities. 
 The abovementioned formula applied to our framework calls for three remarks. 
First, a weight is attached to each capital charge that reflects a specific dependence 
structure. Specifically, 1π  is attached to 1f  the distribution of the capital charge obtained 
under the comonotonic copula. Second, it is assumed that these mixing weights could be 
determined through a risk assessment exercise so as to reflect organizations’ quality of 
internal control environment. For example for firms with improved internal control 
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environment, the first weight 1π  assigned to the comonotonic copula, could be set close 
to zero. Third, the empirical distribution of the overall capital charge is generated by 
Monte Carlo simulation runs from the if  and the mixing weights iπ  for 1,..., .i n=  
Consequently, key descriptive statistics regarding the overall capital charge can be 
provided. 
In light of these clarifications, the proposed approach can be seen as an efficient 
framework that provides not only bounds for the overall capital charge, but also 
incentives for banks and insurers to improve their handling of operational risk. 
 It is worth noticing at this stage that the mathematical formulation of this 
approach is particularly simple. Its computational implementation, by contrast, is quite 
complex due to the rating target set by the Committee (99.9%), which may require a very 
large number of simulation runs to get consistency in the results according the upper tail 
dependence properties. 
  The next section presents the empirical analysis. Key descriptive statistics are 
given and various results related to the estimation of the loss severity distribution for 
industry-wide banks and insurers as well as for specific firms are analyzed. The 
sensitivity of the capital charge to the choice of copulas is investigated and finally, the 
empirical probability distribution function of the overall capital charge is described.  
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This study examines the implications of using the AMA as a method to assess operational 
risk capital charges for banks and insurance companies and analyzes the extent to which 
the four key elements of the AMA, that is, internal data, external data, scenario analysis, 
and business environment and control factor could be encompassed in a model. The 
theoretical model, presented in chapter 3 provides the mathematical background within 
which Monte Carlo simulations are carried out to determine the empirical distribution of 
the overall capital charge. This chapter describes the empirical investigation using 
publicly available operational losses. Section 4.2 describes key descriptive statistics and 
motivates the risk classification schemes within which loss severities are calibrated and 
capital charges determined. Section 4.3 discusses the calibration of the parameters of the 
loss severity distribution using three distributional assumptions for the random truncation 
point. Lastly, section 4.4 provides the descriptive statistics as well as the histogram of the 
empirical distribution of the overall capital charge.  
4.2 The Data Set 
 
The empirical exercise uses publicly available operational losses provided by Fitch Risk 
Management. This firm captures financial and non-financial operational risk losses that 
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are in excess of $1 million from public sources such as court filings and news reports. In 
addition to individual losses, the data set contains various organizations’ exposure 
indicators such as number of employees, gross income, assets, physical assets, 
compensation, and deposits. Essentially, these large operational losses are used to 
supplement banks’ internal loss data in calibrating the tail of the loss severity distribution. 
  In the sequel, key descriptive statistics related to contributors of losses and 
individual losses (that occurred in the United States) are provided. Contributors of losses 
are referred to as bank and insurance organizations in the US market that incurred the 
losses captured by Fitch.  
For the period ranging from 1980 to 2002, Table 1.1 indicates that operational 
losses were captured from 1244 bank organizations grouped in 998 parent banks and 381 
insurers grouped in 302 parent insurance organizations.  The total losses incurred by 
these organizations amount to $58,552 million for banks, and $22,535 million for 
insurers. In terms of total number of losses per contributor, Table 1.1 also shows that 
Fitch has captured only one loss in excess of 1$ million from nearly 80% of contributors.  
This is an important fact that impacts the calibration of the underlying loss distribution. 
This subsection analyzes the distribution of contributors’ truncation point above 
which Fitch captures operational losses. Fitch is supposed to capture and report all losses 
in excess of a threshold set to $1 million. The focus here is to investigate the actual 
distribution of the truncation point by contributor (See Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) page 10 
for more discussion on threshold and truncation point). For US banks, Table 1.2 indicates 
that the contributor’s truncation point ranges from $1 million to $1980 million. Among 
business lines, Retail Banking has the highest number of contributors, i.e. 599 and the 
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highest contributor’s truncation point i.e. $1980 million while Payment and Settlement 
has the lowest number of contributors, i.e. 21, and at the same time, the lowest 
contributor’s truncation point, i.e. $209 million. As to loss event types- Table 1.3, CPBP 
has the highest number of contributors, i.e. 598 and the highest contributor’s truncation 
point, i.e. $1980 million. Internal Fraud ranks second in terms of both number of 
contributors and contribution’s truncation point. 
 With regard to the insurance industry-Table 1.4, CPBP has the highest number of 
contributors, i.e. 264 and the highest contributor’s truncation point, i.e.  $1094 million. 
 Both bank and insurer contributors’ truncation point are significantly skewed to 
the right. According to Table 1.2, 1.3 and 1.4, the coefficient of skewness is 15 for banks 
and 5 for insurers. A log scale is thus used to represent the distribution of contributors’ 
truncation point. 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 show the histogram of the contributor’s log-truncation-point 
for US banks and insurers. For the first category, according to Table 1.5, the contributor’ 
truncation point at the 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles are $2 million, $4 million, $12 
million, and $80 million, respectively. For the insurers, these percentiles are $2 million, 
$5 million, $19 million and $120 million.  
The results of these preliminary analyses and considerations visibly suggest that it 
would not be appropriate to treat the contributor’s truncation point as constant and known 
i.e. $1 million. 
As to the size of these contributors, table 2.1 provides summary statistics for 
banks and insurers’ exposure proxied by their total revenue. It is noticed that more than 
50% of both organizations have no exposure reported. The revenue is clustered according 
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to the euclidean distance into 3 categories based on the size of the organizations, i.e.  
small size, medium size and large size. According to this classification scheme, within 
the US bank contributors, 26 contributors could be considered as large banks while 
within the US insurer contributors, 10 could be deemed as large insurers. Table 2.2 shows 
that the median of the total revenue amounts to $7,793 million for banks and $9,241 
million for insurers. The two aforementioned classifications are used to calibrate the loss 
severity distribution according to organization size. 
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 display the yearly aggregate losses for US banks from 1980 to 
2002. One notices the existence of a cycle with peaks in 1984, 1988, 1994, 1998 and 
2002. The length of the cycle is approximately four years. The first figure splits the total 
yearly aggregate losses into the standard BCBS eight business lines. In 1988 and since 
2000, retail banking has become a major business line in terms of yearly aggregate losses. 
Trading and Sales ranks second. Figure 3.2 breaks the total yearly aggregate losses into 
the seven event types. Clearly, CPBP is the main risk driver of operational risk losses for 
US banks. Internal Fraud also accounts for an important part of the total yearly aggregate 
losses. Figure 3.3 analyzes CPBP losses by splitting them into various components 
defined by Fitch. Deceptive Sales Practices and Concealment followed by Failure to 
Disclose appear to be the main risk drivers of CPBP.  
As to US insurers, Figure 3.4 indicates that insurers’ operational losses started 
increasing from 1992 and that CPBP is also the main risk driver. It may be the case that 
insurers’ operational losses are subject to more disclosure from 1992. Similar to US 
banks, Figure 3.5 shows that Deceptive Sales Practices and Concealment most account 
for insurance CPBP losses. 
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Figure 3.6 compares the US bank and insurer yearly aggregate losses and clearly 
indicates that banks incurred more operational losses than insurers. 
As to loss occurrences, Figure 3.7 displays the US bank yearly loss occurrences 
and indicates an upward trend. The same result holds true for the US insurer yearly loss 
occurrences as shown by Figure 3.8. 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show total loss amounts and occurrences incurred by the US 
banks from 1960 to 2003.  Total loss amounts are split into BCBS eight business lines 
and seven event types. Retail Banking followed by Trading and Sales is the leading 
business line while CPBP and Internal Fraud are the two major loss event types.  
As to loss occurrences, Retail Banking has the highest number of individual losses 
both overall and specifically for CPBP. Again CPBP among the seven event types shows 
the highest number of individual losses. Internal Fraud ranks second. Likewise, for the 
US insurers, Table 4.3 indicates that CPBP is the main risk.  
One notices that some business lines and event types such as Agency Service, 
Payment and Settlement, Damage to Physical Assets and Business Disruption & System 
Failure have few observations or no observations. 
In view of these results, it seems appropriate to conduct the calibration of the loss 
severity as well as the calculation of the capital charges by dividing banks’ activities as 
follows: 
1- All business lines – CPBP (or relationship risk class according to Fitch 
classification). 
2- All business lines – Internal Fraud and Employment Practices and Workplace 
Safety (or people risk class according to Fitch). 
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3- All business lines – Other event types. 
Alternatively, for comparison purposes, a classification by business units instead of 
business lines is employed. 
For the insurance industry, the following classification is used. 
1- CPBP 
2- Other event types 
These calculations are developed and explained in the sequel. 
 
4.3 Loss Severity Distribution Function 
 
The period of study ranges from 1960 to 2002 and is conducted according to the 
abovementioned classification. For each business unit, Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1 give the 
parameters of the observed loss severity distribution that include the underlying loss 
severity distribution and the random truncation point distribution. The results indicate 
that the constant and known assumption regarding the truncation point yields the highest 
level of the loss severity parameter while the logistic assumption gives rise to the lowest 
level. Specifically, the constant and known assumption does not account for reporting 
bias and assigns a uniform weight to all losses. Further developments (Table 5.7) show 
that this line of reasoning leads to a higher level of capital charges and to the belief that 
operational risk is extremely risky. 
The most risky business unit is Investment Banking that comprises two business 
lines, namely Corporate Finance and Trading and Sales. The underlying loss severity 
parameters (also referred to as tail parameters) are 2.550, 1.1199 and 1.232 for the 
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constant and known assumption, the logistic assumption, and the normal assumption, 
respectively. The most risky event type is CPBP, especially for Investment Banking.  
As to insurers, tail parameters except for the constant and known assumption are 
less than 0.6. This range of tails leads to the conclusion that insurers may be less exposed 
to operational risk than banks. 
It is to be noted that for a specific business line/loss event type cell i , the 
following relationship between the tail parameter ( )iβ and the first and second moment of 
the loss severity distribution holds: 
(1) If ( ) 1 then ( ( ))i E L iβ ≥ =∞  
(2) If 205 ( ) 1 then ( ( ))  and  ( ( ) )i E L i E L iβ≤ < <∞ =∞  
(3) If 2( ) 0.5 then ( ( ))  and  ( ( ) )i E L i E L iβ < <∞ <∞  
The log likelihood of the three models suggests that the logistic distributional 
assumption most accounts for the reporting bias. But since the log likelihood yields a bias 
in comparing different distributions, the Akaike information Criterion (AIC) is computed 
and the likelihood ratio test is performed to acknowledge the fit of the logistic 
distribution (Werneman, 2005).  The AIC is defined as follows: 
 2 ln 2AIC L q= − +  
where ln L is the log-likelihood function and q is the number of parameters of the 
distribution fitted. The smaller the AIC, the better the model fits the data.  
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.2 provide the loss severity and the truncation point 
distribution parameters analyzed by business lines. Trading and Sales appears to be the 
most risky business line, followed by Agency Services. 
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 Tables 5.3 and 5.4 provide the results of the loss severity calibration by firm size. 
They indicate that small firms, or firms with revenue below the median, have the highest 
level of tail parameter. These results are in line with those obtained by Shih et al (2001), 
that is the size of an operational loss is weakly related to firm size.  
The severity parameter of a specific organization is calibrated using the 
methodology previously described. Table 5.5 provides the results of this calibration. The 
PML along with its reporting probability is set to $1000 and 0.99, respectively. The 
resulting tail parameter is 0.472 when all business lines and event types are combined. 
For the most prominent business lines and event types, Figures 5.3 to 5.12 show 
the Quantile-Quantile plots, the graph of the observed severity distribution and the 
underlying severity distribution. CPBP QQ-plot shows a slight decline in fit towards the 
tail of the distribution, while retail banking display a substantial decline in fit. As to 
insurers, the QQ-plots cannot be displayed since the acceptance-rejection algorithm used 
to simulate the observed loss severities fails to converge48.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
and Anderson-Darling tests have not been performed because these tests are not 
appropriate for distributions of excesses over some thresholds (Moscadelli, 2004 page 
43). 
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 present the graph of the distribution function of the random 
truncation point for both the specific organization and the industry-wide organization. 
 
4.4 Capital Charges 
 
                                                 
48  Simulating new data from the initial data set using bootstrap technique may help to get the convergence. 
This is left for future research. See Moscadelli (2004) page 18  for similar application in operational 
risk. 
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Value at Risk at 99.9% rating target is the risk measure required by BCBS. This paper 
aims at deriving the empirical distribution of the aggregated capital charge so as to reflect 
the distribution of estimates of the underlying parameters and randomness of the Monte 
Carlo simulations. Specifically, 1 million of aggregate marginal losses and 150 000 
aggregate dependent losses are simulated. Aggregate loss empirical rank correlations are 
computed from historical data and linear correlations derived from these rank correlations 
are adjusted according to expert judgment. Typically, when aggregate loss empirical 
correlations are negative, they are adjusted to 4% and when they are greater than 10%, 
they are lowered to 10% (see Frachot et al. (2004) and Tang et al. (2004) for similar 
adjustment). Table 5.6 shows the sample aggregate loss correlations with their 
adjustments. For the base scenario, the estimates are assumed to be non-random. Other 
scenarios reflecting estimate and correlation uncertainty as well the risk mitigating 
impact of insurance will be examined in future work.  The computer program has been 
designed accordingly49. Figures 5.15, 5.16, and 5.17 present the distribution of the capital 
charges for three event types, while Figure 5.18 gives the distribution of the aggregated 
capital charge under the Student’s t-copula with one degree of freedom. In all cases, 
distributions are approximately normal. Figure 5.19 plots the aggregated capital charge in 
terms of the degrees of freedom for elliptical copulas. It is noticed that the level of capital 
charge is inversely related to the number of degrees of freedom. Within this specific 
family of copulas, the Cauchy copula gives rise to the highest aggregated capital charge, 
while the normal copula yields the lowest aggregated capital charge. This result is in line 
with the upper tail dependence property for elliptical copulas. For banks and insurers, 
                                                 
49  A simulated data set accompanied by the Mathematica and C# programs will be made available upon 
request to the author. 
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Tables 5.10 and 5.11 give the aggregated capital charge along with the capital saving for 
both an industry-wide organization and a specific organization. The yearly loss frequency 
is assumed to be equal to 50. The highest capital saving is achieved through the 
independence copula case. In terms of percentage, the saving ranges from 6% to 11% for 
banks, and from 2% to 3% for large insurers. For the specific insurer it ranges from 5% to 
10%. For large organizations, the capital savings are less significant for insurers since, 
due to lack of sufficient data, two event type subclasses was considered compared to 
three for the banks. This result was expected since the diversification benefit increases 
with the number of business line/event types used. These levels of capital charge need to 
be compared with those obtained by combining all business lines/event types. Table 5.9 
allows such a comparison.  For a typical large bank, when all business lines and event 
types are combined, the capital charge amounts to $3,460 million. In the case where 
bank’s activities are divided into three lines, the capital charge for the normal copula 
amounts to $6,324 million. 
Table 5.12 provides the descriptive statistics for the distribution of the aggregated 
capital charge.  The amount obtained under the Cauchy copula ranks first for most 
locations, scales, and percentile measures. The skewness and kurtosis excess coefficients 
are close to those of normal distribution.  
 The overall capital is then calculated as a mixing weighted capital. The illustrative 
case assumes that the weight assigned to each dependence structure is 8% except for the 
comonotonic dependence. As to this latter case, the weight is 4%. Table 5.13 provides 
these weights. To get the empirical distribution of the weighted capital charges, 1 million 
of n-component mix random variables are simulated (n=13). Figure 5.20 and 5.21 show 
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the histograms of the mixing weighted capital charge for both the industry-wide 
organization and the specific organization. Table 5.14 provides the descriptive statistics. 
It shows that for the industry-wide bank, the mixing weighted capital as measured by the 
mean of the distribution is $6,433 million while for the specific organization, it amounts 
to $443 million.  
The last table (Table 5.15) uses the model set in Powojowski (2002) to show the variation 
of the capital charge as the common shock intensity increases from 1 to 2. This variation 
is $2 million for the specific bank (from $73 million to $75 million) and $1 million for 
the specific insurer (from $59 million to $60 million). 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation investigates the implications of using the AMA-LDA to model 
operational risk capital provisions for banks and insurance companies. My study clearly 
reveals that operational risk is a major risk class, as evidenced by the level of capital 
charges that banks and insurers are required to hold. My results suggest that the level of 
operational risk capital charge could exceed US$6 billion for large internationally active 
banks, and US$600 million for large insurers. These amounts are in line with those 
disclosed by these institutions, that is, US$2 billion to US$7 billion for banks and 2 
percent of net premium on average for insurers. They are also consistent with the 
amounts estimated in Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) for banks.   
More specifically, this dissertation develops an approach based on the 
methodology set forth in Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) to calibrate the tail of operational loss 
severity distribution using publicly available operational loss data and accounting for 
firm’s specificities through the level assigned to the PML. My study also proposes a 
model that expresses the distribution of the overall capital charge as a finite mixture 
distribution, accounting for quality of risk management by means of the weight attached 
to each component distribution that reflects a specific dependence structure.  
Consistent estimates of capital charges and loss severity distribution parameters 
are obtained by modeling the contributor’s truncation point as an unobserved random 
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variable. In addition, my study makes use of extreme value theory, assumes a 
homogeneous Poisson distribution for loss frequencies, and accounts for dependence 
structure across risk types through copulas.  
My findings also indicate that operational risk losses are driven by CPBP and 
internal fraud. As a result, quality of internal control environment of a firm is a key factor 
that highly impacts firm’s loss severity distribution and thereby its capital charge 
distribution. Consequently, a natural extension of my research will be a formal 
quantification of quality of internal risk control environments. The frameworks set by 
NAIC50, GLBA, FDICIA, SOX, and BCBS51 will provide an appropriate background for 
this exercise.   
A further extension of my study would be the quantification of the capital charge 
by means of coherent risk measures such as CTE and Wang Transform measure at 95% 
confidence level currently used in the insurance industry. Rescaling individual loss 
amounts based on firm’s exposure remains a fruitful area for future research as well. 
Currently, the scaling formulas that have been proposed in the literature are still in their 
infancy due to a lack of adequate loss data to test for their robustness. 
Another noteworthy finding lies in the fact that the capital charge is significantly 
driven by the number of risk types set out in the bank’s risk classification scheme. As a 
result, BCBS needs to provide incentives for banks that use a more granular classification 
scheme.  
As of today, operational risk accounts for at least 25% of the overall economic 
capital of a firm. Consequently, this specific risk class should be envisioned as a key 
                                                 
50  Via the Risk-Focused Surveillance Framework. 
51  Through the second pillar (supervisory review) and the third pillar (market discipline). 
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component of an enterprise-risk management strategy and failure to account for its capital 
requirement significantly distorts decisions based on risk-adjusted return on capital 
(RAROC). 
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Table 1. 1 --US Bank and Insurers - Number of Losses per Contributor 
                  
Banks Insurers 
Parent Organization Organization Parent Organization Organization Number of Losses Per 
contributor Number %  Number % Number % Number % 
1 791 79 1026 82 217 72 305 80 
 2  -   9 187  19 202 16 81 27 76 20 
>9 20 2 16 1 4 1 0 0 
Total 998 100 1244 100 302 100 381 100 
 
Table 1. 2 --US Bank Contributors’ Truncation Point ($ M)   
Descriptive Statistics by Business Lines 
 
                    
  
COFI TRSA REBA COBA PASE AGSE ASMA REBR All  
Number of 
Contributors 47 96 599 237 21 52 121 242 1,244 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 213 1,899 1,980 453 209 536 417 254 1,980 
Mean 16 114 18 24 20 24 32 10 23 
Standard Deviation 6 18 9 7 7 9 8 5 10 
Skewness 4 5 18 5 3 6 4 7 15 
Excess Kurtosis 21 21 378 29 10 38 16 59 259 
 
 
COFI: Corporate Finance-TRSA: Trading & Sales- REBA Retail Banking- COBA: Commercial Banking- PASE: Payment & 
Settlement  AGSE: Agency Services – ASMA: Asset management- REBR Retail Brokerage 
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Table 1. 3 --US Bank Contributors’ Truncation Point ($ M)  
Descriptive Statistics by Event Types 
        
 DAPA EXFR EPWS INFR EDPM CPBP BDSF 
Number of Contributors 6 272 53 436 79 598 7 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Maximum 89 242 52 1,899 417 1,980 363 
Mean 23 13 9 27 15 30 61 
Standard Deviation 6 5 3 12 7 11 12 
Skewness 2 5 2 12 7 12 2 
Excess Kurtosis 1 32 6 153 49 175 2 
 
 
DAPA: Damage to Physical Asset- EXFR: External Fraud- EPWS: Employment Practices & Workplace Safety- INFR: Internal 
Fraud- 
EDPM: Execution, Delivery & Process Management - CPBP: Clients, Products & Business Practice BDSF: Business Disruption & 
System Failure 
 
Table 1. 4 --US Insurer Contributors’ Truncation Point ($ M)  
Descriptive Statistics by Event Types 
 
         
 DAPA EXFR EPWS INFR EDPM CPBP BDSF ALL 
Number of Contributors 1 19 17 71 53 264 1 381 
Minimum 208 1 1 1 1 1 341 1 
Maximum 208 295 94 420 92 1,094 341 599 
Mean 208 21 21 21 8 38 341 25 
Standard Deviation  8 5 8 4 10  8 
Skewness  4 2 5 4 7  5 
Excess Kurtosis  14 1 31 14 69  37 
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Table 1. 5 --US Bank & Insurer Contributors’ Truncation Point ($ M) by 
Percentiles 
 
     
Percentile 25% 50% 75% 95% 
US Banks 2 4 12 80 
US Insurers 2 6 19 120 
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Figure 1.1 --US Banks - Histogram of Contributor’s Log-Truncation-Point. –  
All  Business Lines and All Event Types 
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Figure 1.2 --US Insurers - Histogram of Contributor’s Log-Truncation-Point – 
 All Business Lines All Event Types 
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Table 2. 1 -- US Banks and Insurers’ Total Revenue 
Descriptive Statistics by Size 
 
                   
 US Banks US Insurers 
 
No 
Exposure  
Reported  
Small Size Medium Size Large Size
No 
Exposure  
Reported 
Small Size Medium Size 
 Large 
Size 
Number of 
Contributors 723 383 113 26 213 109 50 10 
Mean   3,458 33,118 109,991  3,995 25,610 81,698 
Min  1 18,631 72,772  17 14,978 60,391 
Max  18,342 65,601 192,390  13,958 49,221 116,729 
Std   4,547 12,749 33,603  3,907 7,774 18,824 
Skewness  1 1 1  1 1 1 
Excess 
Kurtosis   1 0 1    0 2 -1 
 
 
 
Table 2. 2 --US Banks and Insurers’ Total Revenue by Percentile 
 
        
 
Total 
Number of 
Losses 
Total With 
Revenue 
Reported Min 
25%  
Percentile 
50% 
Percentile 
75%  
Percentile Max 
US Banks 1989 891 1 927 7,793 24,695 192,390 
US 
Insurers 530 250 17 3,055 9,241 26,158 116,729 
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Figure 3.1 --US Banks Yearly Aggregate Losses By Business Lines & Settlement Year 
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Figure 3.2 --US Banks - Yearly Aggregate Losses By Event Types & Settlement Year 
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Figure 3.3 --US Banks - Yearly Aggregate Losses By CPBP Sub Event Types & Settlement Year 
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Figure 3.4 --US Insurers - Yearly Aggregate Losses By Event Types & Settlement Year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5  Yearly Aggregate Losses By CPBP Sub Event Types & Settlement Year – US Insurers 
Figure 3.3 Yearly Aggregate Losses By CPBP Sub Event Types & Settlement Year  – US Banks 
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Figure 3.5 --US Insurers - Yearly Aggregate Losses By CPBP Sub Event Types & Settlement Year 
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Figure 3.6 --US Banks & Insurers - Yearly Aggregate Loss by Event Types & Settlement Year 
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Figure 3.7 --US Banks - Yearly Aggregate Loss Amounts & Occurrences by Settlement Year 
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Figure 3.8 --US Insurers - Yearly Aggregate Loss Amounts & Occurrences by Settlement Year 
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Table 4. 1 --US Banks - Total Loss Amount by Business Lines & Event Types 
 
 Internal Fraud 
External 
Fraud 
Employment 
Practices & 
Workplace Safety 
Clients, Products 
& Business 
Practices 
Damage to 
Physical 
Assets 
Business 
Disruption & 
System Failures
Execution, Delivery 
& Process 
Management 
Total 
Corporate Finance 1,426 0 8 1,214 0 0 4 2,652 
Trading & Sales 6,670 0 5 7,232 0 363 223 14,494 
Retail Banking 3,623 1,830 292 13,409 22 3 990 20,169 
Commercial Banking 3,605 2,843 327 3,491 213 128 42 10,649 
Payment & Settlement 61 8 0 304 89 8 4 474 
Agency Services 123 758 3 1,296 0 0 362 2,542 
Asset management 2,046 204 111 3,249 0 0 532 6,143 
Retail Brokerage 1,072 52 214 7,383 0 16 54 8,791 
Total 18,626 5,695 961 37,579 324 519 2,212 65,915 
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Table 4. 2 --US Banks - Loss Occurrences by Business Lines & Event Types 
 
 Internal Fraud 
External 
Fraud 
Employment 
Practices & 
Workplace Safety 
Clients, Products 
& Business 
Practices 
Damage to 
Physical 
Assets 
Business 
Disruption & 
System Failures
Execution, Delivery 
& Process 
Management 
Total 
Corporate Finance 12 0 1 62 0 0 1 76 
Trading & Sales 48 0 2 60 0 1 8 119 
Retail Banking 272 191 20 271 3 1 51 809 
Commercial Banking 74 127 14 101 3 2 8 329 
Payment & Settlement 6 2 0 13 1 1 1 24 
Agency Services 13 3 1 44 0 0 4 65 
Asset management 40 9 3 82 0 0 5 139 
Retail Brokerage 69 12 33 293 0 3 18 428 
Total   534 344 74 926 7 8 96 1989 
 
Table 4. 3 -- US Insurers - Loss Occurrences  by Business Lines & Event Types 
 
 Internal Fraud 
External 
Fraud 
Employment 
Practices & 
Workplace Safety 
Clients, Products 
& Business 
Practices 
Damage to 
Physical 
Assets 
Business 
Disruption & 
System Failures
Execution, Delivery 
& Process 
Management 
Total 
Total Loss Amount 1,616 411 573 19,214 208 341 648 23,011 
Total Loss Occurrence 74 21 20 344 1 1 68 529 
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Table 5. 1 --US Banks & Insurers –Observed Loss Severity Distribution Parameters by Business Units/Event Types and 
Random Truncation Distributional Assumptions 
Business Units Event Types Tail beta Scale sigma Location mu  LogLikelihood AIC # Loss Max
    Constant Logistic Normal  Logistic Normal  Logistic Normal   Constant Logistic Normal  Constant Logistic Normal    Loss
US Banks                   
All Business Units All Event Types 1.826 0.750 0.886 0.934 2.177 4.481 4.481  -3187 -3107 -3116 6376 6220 6235 1989 2243
       (0.052)   (0.086) (0.040)     (0.104)    (0.108)     (0.417) -          
 CPBP 2.031 0.848 0.935 0.890 1.835 3.807 3.807  -1582 -1518 -1522 3166 3042 3048 926 2243
       (0.091)   (0.111) (0.050)     (0.082)    (0.102)     (0.513) -          
 Internal Fraud - 
EPWS 1.648 0.778 0.908 1.054 2.429 4.581 4.581  -936 -919 -921 1873 1845 1848 608 1899
       (0.083)   (0.185) (0.080)     (0.257)    (0.266)     (1.040)           
 Other Event Types 1.560 0.352 0.805 0.432 2.621 5.636 5.636  -657 -645 -650 1316 1298 1304 455 535.8
       (0.085)   (0.194) (0.118)     (0.287)    (0.446)     (0.357) -          
Investment Banking All Event Types 2.550 1.199 1.232 0.887 1.611 3.105 3.105  -378 -356 -356 757 717 716 195 1899
       (0.276)   (0.288) (0.112)     (0.116)    (0.165)     (1.018) -          
 CPBP 2.535 1.041 1.099 0.763 1.464 3.204 3.204  -235 -217 -218 473 440 439 122 1825
       (0.369)   (0.277) (0.126)     (0.106)    (0.160)     (0.944) -          
Banking All Event Types 1.755 0.665 0.838 0.841 2.176 4.682 4.682  -1917 -1869 -1875 3836 3743 3755 1227 2000
       (0.062)   (0.104) (0.052)     (0.140)    (0.144)     (0.444) -          
 CPBP 2.079 0.978 1.018 0.887 1.648 3.128 3.128  -743 -710 -710 1488 1425 1425 429 2000
       (0.140)   (0.171) (0.069)     (0.088)    (0.128)     (0.750) -          
Other Business Lines All Event Types 1.733 0.674 0.840 0.848 2.146 4.455 4.455  -879 -857 -860 1759 1720 1724 567 2243
       (0.091)   (0.136) (0.075)     (0.175)    (0.210)     (0.666) -          
 CPBP 1.813 0.634 0.831 0.757 2.037 4.468 4.468  -598 -579 -582 1198 1164 1168 375 2243
       (0.121)   (0.134) (0.088)     (0.159)    (0.219)     (0.617) -          
US Insurers                  
 All Event Types 2.184 0.479 0.896 0.535 2.237 5.471 5.471  -942 -900 -912 1887 1806 1828 529 2272
       (0.129)   (0.084) (0.091)     (0.098)    (0.200)     (0.294) -          
 CPBP 2.540 0.598 0.857 0.591 1.743 4.862 4.862  -665 -609 -616 1331 1225 1236 344 2272
       (0.220)   (0.101) (0.079)     (0.088)    (0.118)     (0.331) -          
 
Other Event 
Types 1.522 0.127 1.064 0.138 4.639 6.293 6.293  -263 -259 -262 527 524 529 185 420 
         (0.119) -  (0.426)  -    (3.893)  - -                     
  
Investment Banking includes two business lines: Corporate Finance and Trading and Sales. Banking includes: Retail Banking, Commercial Banking, Payment & Settlement and 
Agency Services. Other business lines include Asset Management and Retail brokerage. EPWS: Employment Practices and Workplace Safety 
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Table 5. 2 --US Banks–Observed Loss Severity Distribution Parameters by Business Lines/Event Types and Random 
Truncation Distributional Assumptions 
 
Business Lines Event Types Tail beta Scale sigma Location mu  LogLikelihood AIC # Loss Max
    Constant  Logistic Normal  Logistic Normal  Logistic Normal   Constant Logistic Normal  Constant Logistic Normal    Loss
Corporate Finance All Event Types 2.106 0.930 0.961 0.644 1.191 2.507 2.507  -133 -122 -122 267 250 248 76 990 
       (0.378)    (0.249)  (0.130)     (0.125)    (0.166)     (0.857) -           
 CPBP 1.994 0.656 0.722 0.550 1.156 3.054 3.054  -105 -94 -94 212 194 192 62 299 
       (0.425)    (0.237)  (0.127)     (0.127)    (0.164)     (0.802) -          
Trading & Sales All Event Types 2.834 0.982 1.084 0.914 1.930 4.813 4.813  -243 -227 -227 488 461 459 119 1899
       (0.407)    (0.374)  (0.154)     (0.243)    (0.232)     (1.213) -          
 CPBP 3.092 1.040 1.149 0.760 1.580 4.048 4.048  -128 -114 -115 257 235 234 60 1825
       (0.716)    (0.422)  (0.196)     (0.165)    (0.206)     (1.123) -          
Retail Banking All Event Types       1.592  0.755 0.866 1.046 2.339 4.253 4.253  -1185 -1166 -1169 2372 2339 2342 809 2000
       (0.066)    (0.149)  (0.066)     (0.210)    (0.230)     (0.910) -          
 CPBP 2.034 1.005 1.056 1.055 1.985 3.459 3.459  -463 -450 -450 929 906 905 271 2000
       (0.162)    (0.264)  (0.099)     (0.165)    (0.234)     (1.388) -          
Commercial 
Banking All Event Types       2.103  0.540 0.788 0.579 1.779 4.741 4.741  -574 -539 -544 1149 1084 1092 329 766 
       (0.167)    (0.144)  (0.086)     (0.150)    (0.158)     (0.419) -          
 CPBP 2.251 0.810 0.860 0.672 1.337 3.455 3.455  -183 -167 -166 368 339 337 101 415 
       (0.365)    (0.305)  (0.121)     (0.140)    (0.161)     (0.985) -          
Payment & 
Settlement All Event Types - - - - - - -        24 209 
Agency Services All Event Types 2.073 0.962 1.004 0.893 1.671 3.285 3.285  -112 -107 -107 227 221 219 65 536 
       (0.358)    (0.536)  (0.182)     (0.253)    (0.340)     (2.292) -          
Asset Management All Event Types 2.248 0.782 0.918  0.829 1.911  4.490 4.490   -252 -239 -240  505 485 484 139 967 
       (0.274)    (0.349)  (0.138)     (0.310)    (0.258)     (1.220) -          
 CPBP 2.291 0.670 0.850 0.699 1.799 4.655 4.655  -150 -141 -142    82 440 
       (0.380)    (0.424)  (0.173)     (0.394)    (0.300)     (1.234) -          
Retail Brokerage All Event Types 1.565 0.573 0.778 0.734 2.110 4.365 4.365  -620 -605 -608 1242 1217 1221 428 2243
       (0.092)    (0.107)  (0.085)     (0.150)    (0.257)     (0.584) -          
 CPBP 1.679 0.590 0.805 0.723 2.063 4.369 4.369  -445 -432 -435 892 871 874 293 2243
         (0.123)    (0.119)  (0.099)      (0.151)    (0.270)      (0.646) -                     
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Figure 5.1 - US Banks Underlying Loss Severity Distribution Parameter by Business Units and Random Truncation Point 
Distributional Assumption 
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Figure 5.2 - US Banks Underlying Loss Severity Distribution Parameter by Business Lines and Random Truncation Point 
Distributional Assumption 
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Figure 5.3 --US Banks - Quantile-Quantile Plot All Business Lines All Event Types 
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Figure 5.4 --US Banks - Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity 
Distribution. All Business Lines All Event Types. 
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Figure 5.5 --US Banks - QQ Plot CPBP 
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Figure 5.6 --US Banks - Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity 
Distribution. CPBP. 
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Figure 5.7  US Banks - QQ Plot  Internal Fraud-EPWS 
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Figure 5.8 US Banks - Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity 
Distribution. Internal Fraud - EPWS. 
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Figure 5.9 US Banks- Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity 
Distribution. Retail Banking. 
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Figure 5.10 US Banks- Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity 
Distribution Retail Banking. 
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Figure 5.11 US Banks- Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity 
Distribution. Retail Brokerage 
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Figure 5.12 US Banks- Observed Severity Distribution and Underlying Severity 
Distribution Retail Brokerage. 
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Table 5. 3  --US Banks & Insurers: Underlying Loss Severity by Exposure (Revenue) All Business Lines and Event Types 
 
                    
 
Bellow Median Revenue Above Median Revenue 
  Number of Losses 
Severity 
Parameter 
Maximum 
Loss($M) 
99.95% Percentile of the 
Underlying Severity 
($M) 
 Number of Losses 
Severity 
Parameter 
Maximum Loss 
($M) 
99.95% Percentile of 
the Underlying Severity 
($M) 
US Banks 582 0.759 2,243 320 446 0.6794 1,824 175 
US Insurers 125 0.6108 2,272 104  125 0.512 1,852 49 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. 4 --US Banks & Insurers: Loss Severity by Exposure (Revenue) All Business Lines and Event Types 
 
                
 US Banks US Insurers 
  Small Size Medium Size Large Size  Small Size Medium Size Large Size 
Number of  Losses 582 243 64 144 88 11 
Severity Parameter 0.878 0.497 0.322 0.571 0.598  
Maximum Loss ($M) 2,243 631 363 2,272 1,852 198 
99.99% Percentile of the  
Underlying Loss Severity 
($M) 
790 44 12  76 94   
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Table 5. 5 – Observed Loss Severity Distribution Parameters Industry-Wide Organization vs Specific Firm 
 
              
   Severity Distribution Parameter 
 PML ($M) Median ($M) 
Prob[Truncation Point <= Specific PML] 
Tail beta Location mu Scale sigma 
Industry-Wide Organization 2,243 88 0.931 0.750 4.481 0.934 
Specific Firm 1,000 88 0.99 0.472 4.481 0.528 
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Figure 5.13 – Random Truncation Point Distribution CDF 
Industry-Wide Organization vs Specific Firm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14 – Random Truncation Point Distribution PDF 
Industry-Wide Organization vs Specific Firm 
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Table 5. 6 US Banks and Insurers: Sample Rank & Linear Correlation by Business Unit/Event types 
                            
Class Business Units Event Types Number of Losses Amount ($M)
Severity 
Parameter Weight 
Kendall Rank 
Sample Correlation
Adjusted Sample 
Linear Correlation 
# Yearly 
Claims 
1 All Business Units CPBP 926 37,579 0.848 0.466 1 0.33   1 0.1   50 
 All Business Units Other Event Types 1063 28,336 0.659 0.534 0.33 1   0.1 1     
2 All Business Units CPBP 926 37,579 0.848 0.466 1 0.33 0.60 1 0.1 0.1 50 
 All Business Units Internal Fraud 608 19,587 0.778 0.306 0.33 1 0.73 0.1 1 0.1   
 All Business Units Other Event Types 455 8,749 0.352 0.229 0.60 0.73 1 0.1 0.1 1   
3 Insurance CPBP 344 19,214 0.598 0.650 1 0.20   1 0.1   50 
 Insurance Other Event Types 185 3,797 0.127 0.350 0.20 1   0.1 1     
* Adjusted Sample Linear Correlation Matrices are Positive Definite 
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Table 5. 7  --US Banks and Insurers 
Capital Charge’s Sensitivity to the Truncation Point Distributional Assumption All 
Business Lines and All Event Types. 
 
                
 Constant Logistic Normal 
  Severity Tail b VaR ($M)  
 Severity Tail 
b VaR ($M)  
Severity Tail 
b VaR ($M) 
US Banks 1.826 >100,000 0.750 2,089 0.886 8,220 
US 
Insurers 2.184 >100,000  0.479 180  0.896 8,633 
 
Assuming yearly number of loss occurrences exceeding $1M equal to 25 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. 8  – US Banks and Insurers  
Capital Charge ($M) Assuming Various Yearly Number of Loss Occurrences 
 
              
  Yearly Number of Loss Occurrences in Excess of $1M  
  
Severity Tail b 
5 10 25 50 70 
US Banks 0.750 599 1,041 2,106 3,562 4,596 
US Insurers 0.479 70 104 179 278 350 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. 9 -- US Banks and Insurers  
Capital Charge ($M) for Three Business Line and Event Type Combinations 
 
               
 All Business Lines & Event Types  CPBP -  Other Event Types
CPBP- Internal Fraud- Other 
Event Types 
  VaR   VaR VaR Increase %  VaR 
VaR Increase 
% 
US Banks 3,460  5,653 63.4 6,324 82.8 
US Insurers 285   611 114.6      
 
Assuming a yearly number of loss occurrences exceeding $1M equal to 50 
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Figure 5.15 --US Banks 
CPBP Capital Charge Distribution ($M) 
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Figure 5.16 --US Banks 
Internal Fraud Capital Charge Distribution ($M) 
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Figure 5.17 --US Banks 
Other Event Types Capital Charge Distribution ($M) 
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Figure 5.18  --US Banks 
 Aggregated Capital Charge Distribution ($M) Using Cauchy Copula 
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Figure 5.19 -- US Banks 
 Aggregated Capital Charge ($M) for the Student’s t -Copula 
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Table 5. 10 -- US Banks 
Capital Charges ($M) and Capital Savings ($M) by Types of Copulas. 
 
                 
  Industry-Wide Bank Specific Bank 
  Capital Saving  Capital Saving 
    
VaR 
Amount %  
VaR 
Amount % 
 Comonotonic 7,015 0 0.00 481 0 0.00 
1 - Cauchy 6,582 433 6.58 448 33 7.26 
2 6,509 506 7.77 446 35 7.81 
3 6,468 547 8.45 444 36 8.17 
4 6,435 580 9.01 443 37 8.41 
5 6,416 599 9.33 442 38 8.68 
6 6,400 615 9.61 441 39 8.88 
7 6,391 624 9.77 441 40 9.00 
8 6,381 634 9.93 440 40 9.17 
9 6,374 641 10.06 440 41 9.26 
10 6,373 642 10.07 440 41 9.30 
D
eg
re
es
 o
f f
re
ed
om
 
Infinite- Normal 6,317 698 11.05 437 44 10.02 
  Independent 6,290 724 11.52  433 47 10.92 
 
 
Banks’ activities are classified into three event types: CPBP – Internal Fraud & EPWS  and Other Event Types. 
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Table 5. 11 -- US Insurers 
Capital Charges ($M) and Capital Saving ($M) by Types of Copulas. 
  
                 
  Industry-Wide Insurer Specific Insurer 
  Capital Saving Capital Saving 
    
VaR 
Amount %  
VaR 
Amount % 
 Comonotonic 625 0 0.00 125 0 0.00 
1 - Cauchy 612 14 2.24 119 6 4.91 
2 611 15 2.43 118 7 5.92 
3 611 15 2.42 117 8 6.84 
4 610 15 2.50 117 9 7.53 
5 611 15 2.41 116 9 8.04 
6 611 15 2.40 116 10 8.38 
7 611 14 2.37 115 10 8.65 
8 611 15 2.38 115 10 8.84 
9 610 15 2.44 115 10 9.01 
10 610 15 2.44 115 10 9.14 
D
eg
re
es
 o
f f
re
ed
om
 
Infinite- Normal 608 18 2.91 113 12 10.43 
  Independent 606 19 3.16  112 13 11.78 
 
Insurers’ activities are classified into two event types: CPBP and Other Event Types 
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Table 5. 12 --US Bank 
Descriptive Statistics of the Capital Charge ($M) 
 
                      
    Mean St-Dev Median 95-Perc 99-Perc
Min 
Confidence 
Interval 
Max 
Confidence 
Interval 
Skewness  Excess Kurtosis
1 - Cauchy 6,582 455 6,560 7,353 7,717 6,552 6,612 0.26 -0.07 
2 6,509 456 6,485 7,284 7,650 6,479 6,539 0.29 0.04 
3 6,468 457 6,436 7,262 7,610 6,438 6,498 0.30 0.09 
4 6,435 454 6,404 7,205 7,584 6,405 6,465 0.30 0.13 
5 6,416 456 6,392 7,204 7,572 6,386 6,446 0.32 0.18 
6 6,400 451 6,376 7,160 7,575 6,370 6,430 0.30 0.23 
7 6,391 451 6,371 7,149 7,576 6,361 6,420 0.31 0.18 
8 6,381 448 6,358 7,142 7,528 6,351 6,410 0.32 0.33 
9 6,374 448 6,354 7,140 7,536 6,344 6,403 0.30 0.15 
10 6,373 453 6,349 7,142 7,516 6,343 6,403 0.34 0.24 
D
eg
re
es
 o
f f
re
ed
om
 
Infinite- 
Normal 6,317 436 6,298 7,083 7,384 6,288 6,345 0.29 0.22 
  Independent 6,290 436 6,279 7,037 7,342 6,262 6,319 0.27 0.16 
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Table 5. 13 -- Mixing Weights by types of copulas 
 
      
 Comonotonic 4% 
1 - Cauchy 8% 
2 8% 
3 8% 
4 8% 
5 8% 
6 8% 
7 8% 
8 8% 
9 8% 
10 8% 
D
eg
re
es
 o
f f
re
ed
om
 
Infinite- Normal 8% 
  Independent 8% 
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Table 5. 14 --US Industry-Wide Bank & Specific Bank 
Descriptive Statistics of the Mixing Weighted Capital Charges ($M) 
 
 
      
  Industry-Wide Bank Specific Bank 
Minimum 5,892 410 
Maximum 7,007 481 
Mean 6,433 443 
Median 6,431 443 
1% Percentile 6,071 422 
5% Percentile 6,234 431 
95% Percentile 6,639 455 
99.9% Percentile 6,830 467 
Confidence Interval 1 6,433 443 
Confidence Interval 2 6,434 443 
Skewness 0.10 0.08 
Excess Kurtosis 0.00 0.00 
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Figure 5-20 US Industry-wide Bank 
Base Scenario Histogram of the Mixing Weighted Capital Charges 
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Figure 5-21 US Specific Bank 
Base Scenario Histogram of the Mixing Weighted Capital Charges 
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Figure 6.1  
 
Coefficient of Upper Tail Dependence for Student’s t-Copula 
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Table 5. 15 -- Capital Charges by Common Shock Intensity 
 
                                                    
 Common Shock Intensity
52                    
1 loss per year  
Common Shock Intensity                     
2 losses per year 
Correlation Capital Charges ($M) Correlation 
Capital Charges  
($M) 
Industry Business Units 
Event 
Types 
Log 
Loss 
Severity 
Tail  
Maximal 
Moment 
of Loss 
Severity
Yearly 
Number 
of 
Losses
  Loss Frequency  
Aggregate 
Losses Min Mean Max  
 Loss 
Frequency  
Aggregate 
Losses Min Mean Max
Banks                   72 73 73         74 75 76 
  All  CPBP 0.393 2 9 1 0.14 0.15 1 0.10 0.11      1 0.27 0.30  1 0.20 0.23    
 All Internal Fraud 0.244 4 6 0.14 1 0.18 0.10 1 0.17     0.27 1 0.37  0.20 1 0.34    
 All  Others 0.080 12 5 0.15 0.18 1 0.11 0.17 1     0.30 0.37 1  0.23 0.34 1    
                                
Insurers                   59 59 60         60 60 61 
 - CPBP 0.342 2 13 1 0.10  1 0.09      1 0.21  1 0.18     
  - Others 0.046 21 7  0.10 1    0.09 1          0.21 1    0.18 1         
 
 
 
                                                 
52 Following Powojowski et al. (2002) model, the dependency between loss event type frequency is generated by a single enterprise-wide source of loss that 
follows a Poisson distribution with intensity λ  
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APPENDIX I 
 
Table A. 1. Risk Weights by Category of On-Balance-Sheet Asset BCBS (1988) 
 
Category of on-balance-sheet asset Risk weights 
(a) Cash 
(b) Claims on central governments and central banks denominated in 
national currency and funded in that currency 
(c) Other claims on OECD central governments3 and central banks 
(d) Claims collateralized by cash of OECD central-government 
securities3 or guaranteed by OECD central governments 
 
(a) Claims on domestic public-sector entities, excluding central 
government, and loans guaranteed4 by such entities 
 
 
(a) Claims on multilateral development banks (IBRD, IADB, AsDB, 
AfDB, EIB53 and claims guaranteed by, or collateralized by 
securities issued by such bank 
(b) Claims on banks incorporated in the OECD and loans guaranteed4 
by OECD incorporated banks 
(c) Claims on banks incorporated in countries outside the OECD with a 
residual maturity of up to one year and loans with a residual 
maturity of up to one year guaranteed by banks incorporated in 
countries outside the OECD 
(d) Claims on non-domestic OECD public-sector entities, excluding 
central government, and loans guaranteed4 by such entities 
(e) Cash items in process of collection 
 
(a) Loans fully secured by mortgage on residential property that is or 
will be occupied by the borrower or that is rented 
 
(a) Claims on the private sector 
(b) Claims on banks incorporated outside the OECD with a residual 
maturity of over one year 
(c) Claims on central governments outside the OECD (unless 
denominated in national currency - and funded in that currency - 
(d) Claims on commercial companies owned by the public sector 
(e) Premises, plant and equipment and other fixed assets 
(f) Real estate and other investments (including non-consolidated 
investment participations in other companies) 
(g) Capital instruments issued by other banks (unless deducted from 
capital) 
(h) all other assets 
0% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0, 10, 20 or 50% 
At national discretion 
 
 
20% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50% 
 
 
100% 
                                                 
53 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Inter-American Development Bank 
(IADB), Asian Development Bank (AsDB), African Development Bank (AfDB), European Investment 
Bank (EIB) 
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Table A. 2. BCBS Business Lines 
 
Business Lines Beta Factors 
Corporate finance  
Trading and sales  
Retail banking  
Commercial banking  
Payment and settlement  
Agency services  
Asset management  
Retail brokerage  
18% 
18% 
12% 
15% 
18% 
15% 
12% 
12% 
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